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NOTES
Constitutional Law—Commerce Clause—The Reaffirmation of State
Sovereignty as a Fundamental Tenet of Constitutional
Federalism—National League of Cities v. Usery.' —On December 12,,
1974, a group of plaintifk including the National League of Cities,
the National Governors' Conference, eighteen States of the United
States, and a number of cities and municipalities' filed suit in federal
district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the en-
forcement of the 1974 amendments" to the Fair Labor Standards Act.
(hereinafter Act or FLSA). 4 The challenged amendments extended
F LSA coverage to all States and municipalities and thereby purported
to govern minimum wages, maximum hours, and overtime rates for
state and municipal employees.'' The plaintiffs contended that this ex-
tension of coverage was beyond the power of Congress under the
commerce clause and as such impermissibly intruded upon the States'
performance of essential governmental functions.`' The argument to
limit Congress' commerce authority was presented even in light of
Maryland v. Wirtz,' in which the Supreme Court, faced with a mark-
' 426 U.S. 833 (19713).
3 The States included Arizona, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Other plain-
tiff's included the Metropolitan Governments of Nashville and Davidson County, Ten-
nessee, and the cities of Cape Girardeau, Missouri, Lompoc, California, and Salt Lake
City, Utah. 426 U.S. at 836 n.7.
3 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55
(amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1970)).
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676 § I, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 20l et seq. (1970)). The original Act required employers to pay
their employees a tninimum hourly wage, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (a) (1940); to pay them at
one and one-half their basic pay for time worked in excess of 40 hours per week, id. §
207(a)(3); to keep certain records to aid in enforcement of the Act, id. § 211(c); and to
comply with certain child labor standards, id. * 212. These provisions were originally
enacted as part of New Deal legislation intended to alleviate the effects of an economic
depression by preventing the interstate shipment of goods manufactured under labor
conditions detrimental to an employee's health, safety, and financial welfare. See id. §
202(a),
The 1938 Act had specifically excluded States and their political subdivisions.
Id. * 203(d). The 1974 amendments redefined "employer" to specifically include a
"public agency." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (Supp. V 1975). "Public agency" was in turn de-
fined as including "the government of a State or political subdivision thereof ...." Id. §
203(x). Furthermore, the definition of "enterprise engaged in commerce or in the pro-
duction of goods far commerce" was amended to cover the "activity of a public agency."
Id. § 203(s)(5). Administrative, executive or professional employees were, however, riot
covered by the 1974 amendments. hi. 213(a)(1). The 1974 amendments also excluded
from coverage any person who "holds a public elective office' or is appointed by an of-
ficeholder to be a "member of his personal staff" or "to serve on a policy valuing level,"
or to advise the officeholder "with respect to the constitutional or legal power of his of-
fice." Id. § 203(e)(2)(c).
°Brief for Appellant at 9a. The plaintiffs contended that this intrusion resulted
from new fiscal burdens placed upon state and local budgets which would require cur-
tailment of governmental services and personnel and would thereby substantially affect
the States' policy decisions as to the manner in which they structured their governmen-
tal services. Id, at 7a-9a.
7 392 U.S. 183 (1968)
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wily similar challenge, both upheld the constitutionality of the 1966
amendments to FLSA 8 which extended the Act's coverage to em-
ployees of state-operated schools, hospitals, and related institutions and
firmly established that it was improper to "carve up" Congress' com-
merce power to protect even sovereign state functions." A three-judge
district court,'" hearing only arguments on the law, granted Secretary
of Labor Usery's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint." While
acknowledging that it was "troubled" by the plaintiff's' contentions, the
district court held that the Wirtz rationale controlled.' 2 This was so
because the state and municipal institutions now covered by FLSA
made substantial purchases of out-of-state goods.'" Therefore, be-
cause interstate commerce was substantially affected, Congress pur-
suant to its delegated commerce authority could regulate the hours
and wages of state employees. 14
On review of the district court's order by direct appeal,' 5 the
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision," reversed and FIELD: The 1974
"Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 831
(amending 29 U.S.C. $$ 201 et seq. (1964)). Except to this extent "any Slate or political
subdivision of a State" was still excluded from the Act's definition of an "employer." 29
U.S.C. $ 203(d)(1964). Congress' rationale for this extension was that public schools and
hospitals, even those not operated for profit, "are engaged in activities which are in
substantial competition with similar activities carried on by enterprises organized for a
business purpose." S. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1966] U.S.
CoNG. & Al). NEWS 3010; H. R. REP. No. 1366, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1966).
392 U.S. at 198-99.
The district court was convened persuant to 28 U.S.C. $ 2282 (1970), which
provides:
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement,
operation or execution of any Act of Congress for repugnance to the Con-
stitution of the United States shall not be granted by any district court or
judge thereof unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a
district court of three judges under section 2284 of this title.
" National League of Cities v. Usery, No. 74-1812 (D.D.C. Dec. 31, 1974) (per
curiam), reprinted in brief for Appellant Appendix A at 10a. The district court stated
that it was acting in accordance with Rules 12 and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Upon dismissal, Chief Justice Burger, pursuant to his capacity as Circuit Justice,
granted relief pendente lite and referred the case to the full Supreme Court precluding
further lower court review of the litigants factual claims. National League of Cities v,
Brennan, 419 U.S. 1321 (1974) (Burger, Circuit Justice).
11 Id. at 9a. In Wirtz, the Supreme Court rejected as "untenable" the State of
Maryland's contention that the 1966 amendments controverted principles of constitu-
tional federalism by interfering with sovereign state functions. 392 U.S. at 195. Finding
that state hospitals purchased significant amounts of out•of-state goods, the Court held
that Congress pursuant to its delegated commerce authority could regulate the labor
conditions in those state activities which had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Id. For a discussion of Wirtz see text at notes 221-31 infra.
13 National League of Cities, No. 74-1812 (D.D.C. Dec. 31, 1974) (per curiam),
reprinted in Brief for Appellant Appendix A at 7a.
" Id.
1 " The jurisdiction to review the district court's order by direct appeal is con-
ferred by 28 U.S.C. $ 1253 (1970).
16 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C.J. and
Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell, J.J., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a concurring opinion.
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amendments to FLSA are not within the authority granted Congress
under the commerce clause" insofar as they directly displace the
States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions.'" The Court further concluded that its ear-
lier decision in Wirtz must be overruled because schools and hospitals
covered by the 1966 amendments are an integral portion of those
governmental services which States have traditionally afforded their
citizens.'"
In overruling Wirtz, National League of Cities can be viewed as the
culmination of a trend of the Burger Court to protect state interests
from federal reach.'" Adopting an approach which apparently at-
tempts to strike a proper balance between state and federal interests,
the Court expressed concern that to endorse the 1974 FLSA amend-
ments would be to sanction an impermissible shift of power from the
States to the Federal government." Although National League of Cities
specifically represents a sharp about-face from the holding in Wirtz,
and generally reflects a "heightened solicitude for the role of the state
within the federal system , "21
 the decision is by no means unprec-
edented. Rather, the Court in National League of Cities drew upon his-
torical principles of constitutional federalism which protect certain
state governmental functions from federal encroachment under the
commerce clause. As such, National League of Cities must be considered
a landmark case which reaffirms state sovereignty as one of the fun-
damental tenets of federalism.
This note will first analyze the way in which the majority derived
from historical concepts of federalism its holding that the otherwise
426 U.S. at 856. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which White and Marshall,
J.J., joined. Id. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 880.
" Congress' power under the commerce clause is "No regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among several States, and with Indian Tribes." U.S. CoNsT. art. 1
§ 8 cl. 3.
12 426 U.S. at 852.
"id. at 855.
" See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, — U.S. —, 96 S. Ct. 598 (1976); Hicks v.
Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry,
401 U.S. 77 (1971); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.•37 (1971). See also Paul v. Davis, —
U.S. —, 96 S. Ct. 1 155 (1976); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Employees v.
Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112 (1970). For a discussion of Employees v. Department of Health & Welfare see
note 260 infra. While these cases do not explicitly involve the protection of traditional
state functions from direct congressional regulation, commentators have regarded them
as displaying various strains of solicitude for state interests and a heightened concern
for the role of the States within the federal system. See, e.g., Note, Municipal Bankruptcy,
The Tenth Amendment and the New Federalism, 89 H A RV. L. REv. 1871, 1874-78 (1976).
21 426 U.S. at 855. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 375 (1976) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). In Elrod, Chief Justice Burger explained that the Court in National League of
Cities "took steps to arrest the denigration of States to a role comparable to the depart-
ments of France governed entirely out of the national capital."
22 Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, The Tenth Amendment and the New Federalism, 89
HARI/. L, REv. 1871, 1874 (1976).
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plenary commerce power may be limited by assertions of state
sovereignty over traditional governmental functions. The second sec-
tion will focus on Justice Brennan's dissent, which vigorously argued
that there is no state sovereignty limitation on Congress' plenary
commerce power and that past attempts to implement such a doctrine
have proved "unworkable."23 The third section will discuss Hamilton's
and Madison's concepts of state sovereignty, as outlined in The
Federalist," in order to reveal the historical roots of the Court's view
of constitutional federalism. The fourth section will trace the judicial
development of these historical principles in cases where States have
attempted to raise a similar state sovereignty limitation to bar the ex-
ercise of delegated federal powers. Finally, it will be argued that the
majority's position in National League of Cities reflects most persuasively
the proper sovereign relationship between the States and the Federal
government as delineated by the Constitution.
I. AN AFFIRMATIVE, STATE SOVEREIGNTY LIMITATION ON THE
FEDERAL COMMERCE POWER
Because past Supreme Court decisions have established conclu-
sively that Congress has a plenary grant of authority over interstate
commerce, 25 the complainants in Natirmal League of Cities did not
challenge the breadth of Congress' commerce power. Rather, the
Court was asked to consider whether the constitutional doctrine of in-
tergovernmental immunity allowed the States to resist the exercise of
Congress' commerce power in the 1974 FLSA amendments.'" The
Court addressed this issue in three analytical stages. In the first part
of its opinion, the Court resolved the question whether the States
have spheres of autonomous power upon which the Federal govern-
ment cannot infringe even pursuant to the exercise of a constitution-
ally delegated power. 27 In the second part of its opinion, the Court
first postulated that the state functions covered by the 1974 amend-
ments contained attributes of sovereignty and then examined whether
federal requirements directly displaced the considered policy choices
of the States as to how they desired to structure wage and hour
provisions. 28 Finally, in the context of distinguishing earlier Supreme
23 426 U.S. at 865 (Brennan,,., dissenting).
24 THE FEDERALIST U. Cooke ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Tut: Ft:DERALisTI.
25 E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964) ("The power of Con-
gress in this field is broad and sweeping; where it keeps within its sphere and violates
no express constitutional limitation it has been the rule of this Court, going back almost
to the founding days of the Republic, not to interfere."); United States v. Wrightwood
Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942) ("The power of Congress over interstate commerce
plenary and complete in itself', may he exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges
no limitations other than are prescribed in Constitution."). See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) I, 196, 197 (1824).
26 426 U.S. at 841. In contrast, the dissent viewed the complaint as an absolute
challenge to the extent of Congress' commerce authority. Id. at 857-58.
" See text at notes 29-57 infra.
2B See text at notes 59-79 infra.
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Court decisions, the Court in the third section considered whether in
certain situations the federal commerce power can regulate traditional
state functions, thereby overriding state sovereignty. 2 "
A. The Power of Congress under the Commerce Clause to Regulate Directly
the Activities of Stales as Public Employers
Because the critical first issue was not framed as a challenge to
the extent of Congress' commerce power, the Court was not forced to
reexamine the settled judicial principle that Congress can fully regu-
late any private activity that affects interstate commerce.'" This princi-
ple, which formed the analytical basis of the Wirtz holding, is
grounded in the supremacy clause 31
 of the Constitution which dictates
that the Federal government may preempt express state regulatory
authority where both are attempting to operate on the same private
activity." In contrast to Wirtz, however, a majority of the Court in
National League of Cities drew a fundamental distinction between the
federal regulation of private and state activities. The Court reasoned
that the supremacy principle, which allows displacement of state laws
incompatible with federal regulations when both affect private in-
terests, does not necessarily mean that the Federal government can
directly regulate the State itself."
In deciding that the supremacy inquiry was inapposite, the
Court was able to frame the issue as a conflict between sovereigns in a
federal system where both have inviolable spheres of autonomous
power."' Viewed from this perspective, the Court explained that the
appropriate inquiry was whether the States as sovereigns operating
within the constitutional system of government could raise an
affirmative limitation as a bar to federal regulation of certain state ac-
tivities regardless of the activities' relationship to interstate
2"See text at notes 79-107 infra.
3"The Supreme Court has often held that Congress' commerce authority extends
to any private activity which bears a substantial and close relation to interstate com-
merce. E.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255 (1964);
North Am. Co. v. S.E.C., 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1046).
" The supremacy clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall he made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
land; and the Judges in every State shall be bond thereby, any thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CossT. art. VI, cl. 2.
32 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819) for an early
construction of this clause.
33 426 U.S. at 845. Foreshadowing his opinion in National League if Cities, Justice
Rehnquist in his dissent in Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) stated: IOUs
well-recognized principle of the Supremacy Clause is traditionally associated with fed-
eral regulation of persons or enterprises, rather than with federal regulation of the
State itself." Id. at 552.
" 426 U.S. at 844, citing Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1869).
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commerce." Finding that there are limits on Congress' commerce
power inherent in our federal system," a majority of the Court held
that States could affirmatively resist the federal regulations in the
1974 FLSA amendments insofar as they applied to traditional gov-
ernmental functions. 37 Although it acknowledged that the Constitu-
tion expressly delegated the commerce power to Congress,'" the
Court reasoned that limitations on that power are appropriate when
Congress seeks to regulate "States as Slotes." 3 "
The Court identified the source of this affirmative limitation as
the doctrine of state sovereignty which recognizes the "essential role
of the States in our federal system of government." 4 ° The Court
reasoned that. the very structure of constitutional federalism is based
on the fundamental principal that. States are sovereigns. As such, a
state in its capacity as a sovereign must be allowed to assert an affirm-
ative constitutional right to be free from direct congressional regula-
tion of its sovereign activities. 4 ' Recognizing that Congress' commerce
authority theoretically extends to the establishment of wage and hour
regulations lin- all employees, the Court explained that the State does
not have the constitutional right to claim the absence of congressional
authority over the basic subject matter. 42 Rather, the Court asserted
that the State can block the application of federal commerce regula-
tions to certain state functions as being an unconstitutional exercise of
that authority. 4" To support this conclusion, the Court. first pointed to
the tenth amendment, which in the Court's view " 'expressly declares
the constitutional poikv that Congress may not exercise power in a
fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function el-
lectively in a federal system., "44
35 426 U.S. at 841.
afi Id. at 842. See also Brief fur Appellee at 30-41 (acknowledging limitations).
37
 426 U.S. at 852. The Court also noted that outer congressional commerce
legisfadon has been found invalid on the grounds that the legislation infringed upon
individual liberties protected by the Constitution. Id. at 841. See, e.g., Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 0 (1969) (due process clause of the fifth amendment as a limitation on
Congress' commerce authority); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (death
penalty provision of Federal Kidnapping Act held unconstitutional as violative of the
right to a jury trial embodied in the sixth amendment).
33 426 U.S. at 840.
39 Id. at 845 (emphasis added).
"Id. at 844.
4 ' Id. at 845.
42 Id. In Fry v. United Stales, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975), the State of Ohio raised a
challenge similar to the one raised in the instant case to the application of a federal
commerce act to sovereign state functions, Speaking of the State's contention, Justice
Rehnquist in dissent explained "the State is not simply asserting an absence of congres-
sional legislative authority, but rather is asserting an affirmative constitutional right, in-
herent in its capacity as a State, to be free from such congressionally asserted author-
ity."Id. at 553.
43
 426 U.S. at 841, 852.
44 Id. at 840, citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975) (emphasis
added). The majority opinion advanced that the tenth amendment was an "express dec-
laration" of a state sovereignty limitation upon Congress' exercise of its commerce
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In analyzing past Supreme Court decisions to buttress this
reasoning, the majority also pointed to judicial recognition of state
sovereignty limitations on various types of federal legislation. For ex-
ample, in New York v. United States 45 the State of New York contended
that it was immune from a federal excise tax imposed on sales of bot-
tled mineral waters taken from state-owned springs because it " was
engaged in the exercise of a usual, traditional and essential govern-
mental function.' " 4 " Although a plurality of the New York Court held
that the State was not immune from the tax," the majority in National
League of Cities concluded that dictum in the three separate opinions
supported the constitutional validity of the judicially implied doctrine
of intergovernmental tax immunity.," The National League of Cities
Court then analogized the tax immunity concept to the affirmative
limitation sought in the instant case because both were "derived from
the sovereignty of the States and the concomitant barriers which such
sovereignty presents to otherwise plenary federal authority." 4 " Further
precedential support for the recognition of a state sovereignty liniita-
tion was found in the post-Civil War cases of Texas v. White" and Lane
County v. Oregon!" These early Supreme Court decisions pointed out
power. 426 U.S. at 842. By characterizing the tenth amendment as merely a "declara-
tion," the majority apparently did not hold that the amendment was itself an explicit
constitutional limitation. Rather, the Court looked to restraints on federal power im-
plicit in the whole Constitution. This interpretation is supported by Justice Rehnquist's
reasoning in his dissent in Fry. There, Justice Rehnquist carefully pointed out that the
tenth amendment does not by its terms limit congressional action, but rather is an ex-
ample of the "understanding of those who drafted and ratified the Constitution that the
States were sovereign in many respects ...." 421 U.S. at 557 (emphasis added). But cf.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) ("The amendment states but a truism
that all is retained which has not been surrendered.").
" 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
"Id. at 574.
"Id. at 583-84.
" 426 U.S. at 843. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Rutledge, delivered the
judgment of the Court in New York. In his opinion Justice Frankfurter stated that he
would uphold a tax upon state functions as long as it was not discriminatory. 326 U.S.
at 582. However, Chief Justice Stone, joined by three others in his opinion, was "not
prepared to say that the national government may constitutionally lay a nondiscrimina-
tory tax on every class of property and activities of States and individuals alike." Id. at
586. Furthermore, the dissenters in New York, Justices Douglas and Black, stated that a
constitutional rule sustaining a federal tax on any state activity unless it was dis-
criminatory "would undermine the sovereignty of the States as it has been understood
throughout our history." Id. at 592.
"426 U.S. at 843 n. 19.
3° 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869). In Texas, the Court upheld an injunction sought
by the State of Texas against purchasers of United States' bonds which were issued
payable to the State of Texas or bearer but were sold to the purchaser by the Confed-
erate government. In allowing Texas to reclaim the bonds as public property, the Court
declared that the maintenance and preservation of State governments was "as much
within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and
maintenance of the National government." 74 U.S. at 725.
51
 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1869). In Lane County, the Court considered a conflict be-
tween a state statute that required county treasurers to pay over to the state treasurer
taxes in gold and silver coin and congressional legislation that made United States'
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that the constitution embodied a fundamental principle of federalism
that States have their ()WTI distinct, independent spheres of
authority. 52
 In light of this principle, the majority in National League of
Cities reasoned that the Supreme Court itself has consistently recog-
nized the essential role of States as sovereign entities within the fed-
eral system. 53
In summary, the Court in National League of Cities concluded that
the sovereign status of States within the federal system of government
means that "there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state
government which may not be impaired by Congress ...."54
 Accord-
ingly, the Court declared that the congressional exercise of the com-
merce power directly affecting the State as a sovereign entity, as dis-
tinguished from commerce legislation regulating only private in-
terests, was the key factor which raised the state sovereignty
limitation." Thus the majority explained that Congress does not lack
an affirmative grant of authority to regulate wages and hours in gen-
eral; rather, the Constitution prohibits Congress from exercising the
notes lawful money and legal tender for debts. Although it construed the word "debts"
in the federal legislation as not referring to state taxes, thereby allowing the state stat-
ute to stand, the Court. in Lane County stated that "the people of each State composed a
State, having its own government, and endowed with all functions essential to separate
and independent existence." 74 U.S. at 76. The Court explained specifically that it was
considering the relationship of the States to the Federal government. The Court
further noted that Madison's concepts in The Federalist which recognized the distinct,
independent authority of States paralleled its view of what constituted a proper rela-
tionship within the federal system. Id.
ss Id. at 76, 725.
53
 426 U.S. at 844. In refering to the tax immunity and the post-Civil War cases,
the Court is certainly subject to the criticism that it has virtually ignored decades of
commerce clause precedent pointing to a broad and plenary congressional commerce
authority. Id. at 857-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, this paucity of support-
ing precedent stems from the fact that the Supreme Court, except in Wirtz and Fry v.
United States, 421 U.S. 54'2 (1975), has been confronted only one other time with a di-
rect federal encroachment on essential state functions. In that situation the Court found
the federal legislation unconstitutional as violative of state sovereignty. Ashton v. Came-
ron County Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 531-32 (1936) (irrigation district organized under state
law was a political subdivision of a state and its fiscal affairs were not subject to control
or interference by the federal government pursuant to its bankruptcy power). The ma-
jority of the commerce clause cases, however, only involve the assertion of federal
power over private interests rather than state functions. See, e.g., Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964); Wickhard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941).
54
 426 U.S. at 845. The Court did not offer a list of these "attributes," but cited
to Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911), which declared that it was exclusively a
State's power to locate its seat of government, to decide when and how it could be
changed from one place to another, and to appropriate the necessary funds for that
purpose.
" 426 U.S. at 845. Explaining this distinction, the Court stated "that a State is
not merely a factor in the 'shifting economic arrangements' of the private sector ... but
is itself a coordinate element in the system established by the Framers for governing
our Federal Union." Id. at 849, citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
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authority in a manner which interferes with state functions which
have attributes of sovereignty.SC The crux of this state sovereignty
doctrine, then, is that the Federal government is prevented from reg-
ulating all State activities in the same fashion as it regulates private ac-
tivities under its commerce authority. However, the implicit corollary
of this state sovereignty rationale is that those state activities which do
not have sovereign attributes can be fully regulated by Congress
under its commerce authority. 57
B. Impact of the 1974 FLSA Amendments upon Essential Stale Functions
In the first stage of the opinion, the Court in National League of
Cities found that Congress may not impair functions of state govern-
ments which have attributes of state sovereignty. The Court's task,
then, in the second part of the opinion was to determine whether the
state functions now regulated by FLSA are essential to a State's sepa-
rate and independent existence. 58
 Virtually assuming the answer, the
Court declared that a State's power to determine wage scales, work
hours and overtime rates of their employees is "[o]ne undoubted at-
tribute of state sovereignty ...." 5" In fact, the Court in dicta deemed
such state activities as fire protection, police protection, sanitation,
public health, and parks and recreation as essential state functions be-
cause they are examples of those performed by governments in their
dual roles of administering public law and furnishing public services
56
 426 U.S. at 845.
"Id. at 854 n. 18. See Fry, 421 U.S. 542, 557-58 (1975). Justice Rehnquist in dis-
sent explained that railroads are so unlike traditional governmental activities that the
Federal government can fully regulate state-owned railroads unfettered by any state
sovereignty limitation. See also United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
56
 426 U.S. at 845, citing Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869)
("fTlhe people of each State compose a State having its own government, and endowed
with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence."). It appears that
this Lane County analysis was derived from Madison's discussion of principles of gov-
ernment under the proposed Constitution. Madison stated "that separate and distinct
exercise of the different powers of government ... is admitted on all hands to be essen-
tial to the preservation of liberty." THE FEDERALIST No. 51 at 348 (J. Madison).
The dissent in National League of Cities characterized this analysis as the
"essential-function test." 426 U.S. at 879. Although the Court in utilizing this test was
determining which functions were "essential," the holding in National League of Cities re-
ferred to "traditional governmental functions." a at 852. Therefore, it is inferred that
"essential" and "traditional" have the same meaning within the context of the instant
case. By allowing a State to raise a state sovereignty limitation to protect "traditional"
state functions, problems are presented when some States have traditionally operated
an activity and others have not
'" 426 U.S. at 845. Other cases have recognized the States' power to control the
labor conditions of state employees. See, e.g., Wilson v. North Carolina ex. rel. Caldwell,
169 U.S. 586, 594 (1898) ("In its internal administration the State (so far as concern the
Federal Government) has entire Freedom of choice as to the creation of an office for
purely state purposes, and of the terms upon which it shall be held by the person filling
the office."). Cf. Ketch v. Board of River Port Pilots Connu'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 557 (1947)
("And an important factor in our consideration is that this case tests the right and
power of a state to select its own agents and officers.").
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traditionally afforded their citizens. 6 " By concluding that the state ac-
tivities now within the ambit. of FLSA were essential functions," the
only unanswered question was whether the 1974 amendments imper-
missibly interfered with the functioning of these activities.
To determine the quantum of interference, the Court reviewed
the appellants' estimates of substantial costs imposed by the 1974.
amendments. 62 The Court first pointed to four examples of how the
increased economic costs would have "a significant impact on the func-
tioning" of state governments; 63 the Court then focused on the
noneconomic "adverse effects" of compliance such as the forced relin-
quishment of governmental activities."' However, apart from the -
economic costs and the forced relinquishment of services—burdens
"426 U.S. at 851. The Court did caution, however, that these examples were
"obviously not an exhaustive catalogue" of all types of essential state functions. Id. at
851 ii. 16. The difficulty of delineating a definitive list of essential functions is illus-
trated by remarks made on the floor of Congress in 1938:
INlo one knows where the court will fix the line of demarcation between
essential functions of Government and other functions. For instance, are
teachers essential agents of the Government? Is education an essential
function of government? Is the establishment of parks and recreational
places an essential function of government? Is fire protection an essential
function of government? Municipalities did not have any firemen in 1776.
83 CoNG. Rm. 8058 (1938) (remarks of Sen. Green) (concerning application of federal
income taxes to state employees after Supreme Court decision).
61
 426 U.S. at 851. The Court in this determination would classify as "essential"
those state functions which involved considered policy choices of elected state officials
about traditional governmental activities. Id. at 847. In adopting this "essential-function"
test, the Court eschewed reference to the classic distinction between "governmental"
and "proprietary" activities often used in past Supreme Court sovereign immunity deci-
sions. Compare New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
opinion) ("[W]e reject limitations upon the taxing power of Congress derived from such
untenable criteria as 'proprietary' against 'governmental' activities of the stales ....")
with Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, '284 (1973)
(state mental hospitals, state cancer hospitals, and training schools are not proprietary
and therefore are immune from suit by state employees under FILSA). However, it is
conceivable that the "governmental" and "proprietary" distinction and the "essential-
function" test protecting traditional governmental activities are equivalent. See Fry v.
United States, 421 U.S. 542, 558 n. 2 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"2
 426 U.S. at 846. See Reply Brief' for Appellant at 48, where conflicting claims
are set forth in "Appellants' Government Impact Statement" and "Appellee's Non-
Impact Claims." The Court maintained that the resolution of these factual disputes as
to the effect of the amendments was not critical to the disposition; therefore, it ac-
cepted as true the well-pleaded allegations of the appellants which outlined substantial
economic costs imposed by the 1974 amendments. 426 U.S, at 846.
" 426 U.S. at 846. The appellants contended: that the police and lire protection
costs for Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee would increase by $938,000 per
year; that the Fire protection yearly budget. of Cape Girardeau, Missouri would increase
$250,000 to $400,000; that Arizona to continue its essential expenditures would have to
increase its budget by $2.5 million; and that California would have to increase its
budget $8 to 16 million per year. Id.
" Id. at 846.47. For example, California asserted its would have to curtail its
Highway Patrol Cadet program because of the overtime expenses required by the Act.
Id. at 847.
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which were apparently not constitutionally significant"—the Court
explained that the determinative constitutional flaw in the amend-
ments was that they would "significantly alter or displace the States'
abilities to structure employer-employee relationships ...." 66 This
displacement of state policy choices in essential functions existed be-
cause the 1974 FLSA amendments, in removing the exemption for
States, effectively required new federal records for'all state employees,
new federal personnel processes and procedures, and Department of
Labor supervision. 67 The 1974 amendments also allowed new person-
nel appeals to Congress and new Federal class actions for purported
violations." The Court stated that even if the Act embodied a better
economic policy than that utilized by any State," there was no doubt
that the amendments supplanted the considered policy choices histori-
cally left to the discretion of elected state officials." Thus, the court
viewed this loss of discretion as more constitutionally significant than
possible increased expenses or diminished services. 7 '
Although the Court had no factual record from the district court
indicating that the amendments would substantially restructure the
traditional ways in which States arranged their governmental affairs, 72
the Court. declared: "Loiur examination ... satisfies us that both the
minimum wage and the maximum hour provisions will impermissibly
interfere with the integral governmental functions of these [States]." 73
Admitting that there was disagreement over the true effect of the
amendments, the Court, however, did "not believe that particularized
assessments of actual impact are crucial ... . "74 Therefore, the Court
" 426 U.S. at 846, 851. Cf. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.,
313 U.S. 508, 527 (1941) (burdens placed on States by federal commerce legislation
raise questions of policy, not constitutional issues).
66 426 U.S. at 851.
"'See 29 U.S.C. § 21 I(a)(b)(c) (1970).
68 1d. § 216(b) (Supp. V 1975).
'39 426 U.S. at 848.
7° Id. at 848-50. See note 59 supra for cases recognizing the States' right to regu-
late the labor conditions of their state employees.
" 426 U.S. at 847-48. Reinforcing this "loss of choice" impact analysis, the Court
pointed to the new overtime requirements in the 1974 amendments as direct penalty on
the "States for choosing to have governmental employees on terms different from those
which Congress has sought to impose." Id. at 849.
72 See Brief for Appellee at 6 n.6 ("The Idistrict] court held no evidentiary hear-
ing and made no factual findings.")
" 426 U.S. at 851. Concerning the appellants' factual allegations, the Supreme
Court used such language as: "may substantially restructure traditional ways;" "enough
can be satisfactorily anticipated for an outline discussion of their general import;" "ap-
pears likely to have the effect of coercing the States;" and "appears likely to be highly
disruptive." Id. at 849, 850. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the Court was not
only considering the questions of law presented, but also weighing and sifting the facts
to assess the likely impact of the 1974 FLSA amendments on the States. As to his as-
sessment, the Secretary of Labor acknowledged that there was now federal regulation
of the States; there were some increased costs because of the FLSA requirements; and
there were now additional requirements imposed upon the States. Brief for Appellee at
12-16.
" 426 U.S. at 851.
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reasoned that since the 1974 amendments significantly altered em-
ployment relationships of States, they interfered with governmental de-
cisions essential to the States' separate, sovereign existence; hence,
they unconstitutionally encroached on state sovereignty." The Court
in National League of Cities thus indicated that the dispositive factor
was not the proof of actual impairment of the States' policy choices,
but rather was a mere prima facie showing that "Congress has attemp-
ted to exercise its Commerce Clause authority to prescribe minimum
wage and maximum hours to be paid by the States in their capacities
as sovereign governments."" Thus the Court concluded that the
"congressional attempt" to displace state policy choices concerning
"fundamental employment decisions" in areas of traditional govern-
mental functions controverted only principles of constitutional
federalism." Therefore without reference to the tenth amendment,"
the Court held merely that the 1974 FLSA amendments were "not
within the authority granted Congress by Art. 1, 8, c1.3.""
C. Extent to Which. the Federal Government May Override the Stale
Sovereignty Limitation
Having found an affirmative state sovereignty limitation, and
having found that this limitation prevented Congess from directly
regulating "essential" state functions through the 1974 FLSA amend-
ments, the Court in the third stage of the opinion attempted to dis-
tinguish Maryland v. Wirtz" and Fry v. United States," In Wirtz, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1966 FLSA
amendments which allowed the Federal government to set the wage
arid hour standards of state employees working in public schools and
hospitals. 82
 Rejecting the State of Maryland's contention that the 1966
amendments were beyond the scope of Congress' commerce power
because they interfered with sovereign state functions," the Wirtz
Court declared that the Federal government under its coin merce
78
 td. at 852.
7f1 fd .
77
	U.S. at 851. The Court was unclear as to exactly what might constitute a
"fundamental employment decision." For example, is the Slates' right to prohibit strikes
by public sector employees a "fundamental employment decision?"
7"
 See note 44 supra for discussion of the Court's view of the tenth amendment.
7"
 426 U.S. at 852. The literal meaning of this holding apparently conflicts with
an earlier statement that the complaints did not challenge the scope of Congress' com-
merce authority. See text at note 25 supra.
"392 U.S. 183 ( 1968).
" 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
Ni 392 U.S. at 201.
"hi. at 193. The State of Maryland also argued that Congress pursuant to its
commerce authority could not expand ELSA coverage through the "enterprise con-
cept;" that the remedial provisions of the Act conflicted with the eleventh amendment;
and that the affected state activities did not have "the statutorily required relationship
to interstate commerce." Id. at 187.
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power could regulate state functions in the same manner as it could
regulate private functions."
This rationale was based on the 1936 case of
t h e	
States v.
California" where the Court upheld the power of the Federal gov-
ernment to recover a penalty for a State's violation of the federal
Safety Appliance Act. In California, the Court rejected the argument
that the State was "engaged in performing a public function in its
sovereign capacity" in operating a state-owned railroad in the port of
San Francisco." It declared, in dicta, that Itihe state can no more
deny the power if its exercise has been authorized by Congress than
can an individual.""'
The majority in National League of Cities found that this dictum
in California was "simply wrong.""" However, the Court did not over-
rule California because its holding was found to be consistent with the
instant case in that the operation of a railroad was not an integral
governmental activity which gave rise to a state sovereignty limitation
on federal commerce legislation." On the other hand, because essen-
tial state functions were implicated in Wirtz, the majority in National
League of Cities found the Wirtz reasoning, which was explicitly
grounded in the California dictum" repugnant to its concept of state
sovereignty. Accordingly, the Court summarily overruled Wirtz" stat-
ing that "States as States stand on quite a different footing than an
individual or a corporation when challenging the exercise of Con-
gress' power to regulate commerce." 2
Although the Court could not distinguish between the state
functions involved in Wirtz and those in National League, of Cities," the
majority was able to find distinguishing factors which allowed its Fry
decision to stand. In Fr-v, the Supreme Court upheld" the constitu-
tionality of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 which authorized
" Id. at 197.
99 297 U.S. 175, 189 (1936), See Act of March 2, 1893, ch. 196 § 2, 6, as amended
April 1, 1896, 29 Stat. 85.
"Id. at 183. The California Court noted, however, that "[a]l1 the essential ele-
ments of rail transportation are present in the service rendered ... [because there) are
the receipt and transportation, for the public, for hire, of cars moving in interstate
commerce." Id. at 182.
" 7 /d. at 185.
99 426 U.S. at 854-55.
" 421 U.S. at 854 n.18. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. at 558 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). ("[The activity of the State of California in operating a railroad was so un-
like the traditional governmental activities of a State that Congress could subject it to
the Federal Safety Appliance Act.").
ti° 392 U.S. at 198.
9 ' 426 U.S. at 855.
" Id: at 854.
" 3 Both the appellee Secretary and the district court agreed that the issues in
National League of Cities and Wirtz were indistinguishable; therefore Wirtz required the
rejection of the appellants' claims. Brief for Appellee at 18; see Brief for Appellants at
6a.
" 421 U.S. at 593-44.
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the President to freeze wages and salaries of all employees, including
State and local government employees."` Noting that the Court in Fry
had found "the degree of intrusion upon the protected area of state
sovereignty ... [to be] even less than ... in Wirtz,"" the majority in
National League of Cities distinguished Fry by pointing to at least our
compelling national interests in that case which rendered a finding of
a state sovereignty limitation inappropriate."' The first factor was that
the Economic Stabilization Act challenged in Fry Was enacted in re-
sponse to an "extremely serious problem" which only collective na-
tional action could alleviate." 8 The second mitigating factor was that
the duration of the federal encroachment was limited to a "specific
period of time.""" Third, the court suggested that there was a con-
stitutional distinction between freezing wages and prescribing new
limits because the States were not forced to remake choices, but were
forced only to maintain the status quo.'" Finally, the Court stated that
the enactment at issue in Fry "operated to reduce the pressures upon
state budgets rather than increase them."'"'
By distinguishing Fry, the majority in National League of Cities
clearly indicated that the state sovereignty limitation is not absolute.'"2
95 Title Il of the Act of Aug. 15, 1970, Pub. L. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799, ms amended
12 U.S.C.	 1904 (Supp. 1 1970).
" 426 U.S. at 852-53.
"1 Perhaps, the Court saw no compelling need to overrule Fry since the Economic
Stabilization Act had expired. See 421 U.S. at 549 (Douglas, J.,) (Justice Douglas would
have dismissed the writ of certiorari in Fry as improvidently granted.).
" 426 U.S. at 853. This factor was similar to the wartime situation in Case v.
Bowles, 327 U.S, 92 (1946), where prices of many products were frozen under the
Emergency Price Control by the Federal government pursuant to its war power. See
text at notes 260.68 infra.
" 426 U.S. at 853.
I U0 Id .
I" Id. This rationale that implies the constitutional infringement is based on
economic burden runs counter to the previous reasoning in National League of Cities that
suggested any direct regulation of essential state functions would be an impermissible
interference with state sovereignty whether or not the state benefitted. Id. at 848.
'"' Id. at 853. The Court explained that the state sovereignty limitation is "not so
inflexible as to preclude temporary enactments tailored to combat a national
emergency." Id. The basis of the Court's reasoning was Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 333,
348 (1917), which held a national emergency may afford a reason for Congress to exert
a power already granted such as prescribing a minimum wage in a national labor dis-
pute. The majority thus buttressed the argument that National League of Cities does not
stand for an absolute state sovereignty limitation on Congress' commerce power. Wilson
relied upon the early case of Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1867), that stated a
constitutional provision such as the right to a jury trial cannot "be suspended during
any of the great exigencies of government." Id. at 121. This dictum was directly fol-
lowed in the famous "emergency" case of Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 528-29 (1935), where the Supreme Court explained:
Undoubtedly, the conditions to which power is addressed are always to be
considered when the exercise of power is challenged. Extraordinary condi-
tions may call for extraordinary remedies. But the argument necessarily
stops short of an attempt to justify action which lies outside the sphere of
constitutional authority. Extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge
constitutional power. The Constitution established a national government
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Viewed in this light, the Court appeared to follow a "balancing ap-
proach," as recognized by Justice Blackmun in his concurring
opinion, 10 " which would allow federal regulation of state functions
"where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state
... compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential."'"
Although the Court seemingly disdained reliance on any factual ex-
amination in National League of Cities, 1 ' this approach suggests that in
future cases the Supreme Court %yin engage in the difficult task of
passing on the relative importance of various types of federal com-
merce legislation. The difficulty of this task is compounded by the
fact that the Court did not articulate clearly the degree or the nature
of the impact necessary to shift the balance in favor of the states. De-
spite these drawbacks, the balancing approach appears workable. In
this respect, the Court in National League of Cities, in distinguishing
Fry, did suggest four factors which would allow federal commerce
regulation directed at States as States to stand.'" Further, according
to the Court, the balancing approach is triggered only after the essen-
tial function test has demonstrated that a state activity is within the
area protected from federal encroachment, and the particular federal
with powers deemed to he adequate, as they have proved to be both in war
and peace, but these powers of the national government are limited by the
constitutional grants. Those who act under these grants are not at liberty
to transcend the imposed limits because they believe that more or different
power is necessary.
Therefore because the majority did not overrule this doctrine that an emergency
cannot expand constitutional authority, Congress must have a plenary grant of com-
merce power which actually extends to all state activities affecting interstate commerce.
However, under ordinary conditions, the States are allowed to assert an affirmative
state sovereignty limitation on Congress' commerce power directly to regulate tradi-
tional state governmental functions. Because Congress has a grant of authority over the
basic subject matter, the state sovereignty limitation, then, is "flexible." This is so be-
cause the Court, weighing the state and federal interests in the balance, can remove the
barrier to federal regulation in specific cases and restore Congress to its full granted
powers.
193
 426 U.S. at 856.
104 Id. Justice 131ackmun's approach, which requires not only an overriding na-
tional interest but also the unavailability of viable alternatives to the national legislation,
appears rather stringent and weighted in favor of the States. Furthermore, in pointing
to the area of environmental protection as an area of significant federal interest, Justice
Blackmun illogically implies that this interest is more important than the federal in-
terest in assuring that individual state workers are paid a minimum wage.
"5 Id. at 846. Nevertheless, the majority proceeded to evaluate in detail the im-
pact of the 1974 FLSA amendments. Id. at 846-47. Justice Brennan in dissent agreed
with the majority's reluctance to rely on the economic burdens as the measure of un-
constitutionality, but he disputed the majority's assessment of the impact of the 1974
amendments on the States. Id. at 874 n. 12.
100 1d. at 853. Restated these are (1) the utilization of federal legislation is the
only effective means to combat a pervasive national problem; (2) the national legislation
is formulated to employ the least restrictive means to alleviate a national problem of
limited duration; (3) the States are not forced to remake past policy decisions, but only
forced to maintain the status qua until the national problem has subsided; or (4) the fed-
eral regulations do not appreciably affect the States' economic resources. Id.
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commerce legislation interferes with this activity.'" It is probable,
then, that in future state sovereignty challenges to federal commerce
legislation, the Court, will make a factual inquiry into the likely impact
of the challenged legislation on the state interests. If there are com-
pelling countervailing national considerations, the Federal legislation
will override the state sovereignty limitation and permit the federal
government to regulate directly essential state functions. In so doing,
the Court will be considering on a case-by-case basis whether particu-
lar federal intrusions disrupt the historical relationship between the
Federal government and the States as embodied in concepts of con-
stitutional federalism.'"
Ii. THE DISSENT
In a vituperative dissent„ Justice Brennan,, joined by Justices
Marshall and White, challenged the majority's holding on three
grounds.°°' First,, the dissent asserted that judicial precedent firmly es-
tablished the plenary nature of the federal commerce power.'" In
particular the dissent pointed to United States where the
Supreme Court made explicit its view that "Mlle sovereign power of
the states is necessarily diminished to the extent of grants of power to
the federal government in the Constitution." 12 Based on this Ian-
"7 Id. at 845-46.
'""See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. at 558 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"D In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens argued that it was difficult to perceive a
"sovereign State's inherent right to pay a substandard wage to the janitor at the state
capital." 426 U.S. at 880, Pointing to a list of valid federal regulations that affect ac-
tivities of the State's janitor, Justice Stevens could not sec meaningful distinctions be-
tween those regulations and the regulations in the 1974 FLSA amendments. Neverthe-
less, he agreed "that it is unwise for the Federal Government to exercise its power in
ways described in the Court's opinion." Id. at 881. This disagreement with the legisla-
tion, however, would not affect his judgment with respect to its validity. Thus, while
sympathizing with the Court's view, he has unable to discern a limitation on the federal
power over the labor market. Id.
110 1d. at 857-58. An example of this precedent is Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) I (1824), where the Court found that the commerce power "is complete in it-
self, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, order (sic)
than are prescribed in the constitution." Id. at 196. The Court stated, however, that
lallthough many of the powers formerly exercised by the States, are transfered to the
government of the Union, yet the State governments remain, and constitute a most im-
portant part of our system." Id. at 198-99.
1 " 297 U.S: 175 (1936).
"2 Id. at 184. Although the dissent contended that this dictum clearly refuted
any notion of a state sovereignty limitation on Congress' commerce power, the majority
declared that this broad statement in CalifOrnia was "wrong." 426 U.S. at 854-55. Limit-
ing California to its facts, the majority reasoned that direct federal regulation of a
state-owned railroad was justified because the operation of a railroad was so unlike an
essential state function, Id, at 854 n. 18. This conclusion is arguably correct because
railroads have been considered traditionally an instrumentality of interstate commerce.
See, e.g., Wisconsin R. R. Comm. v. C. B. & Q. R. R., 257 U.S. 563 (1922). See also
Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 27 (1911) (because interstate and intrastate
railroad equipment often are commingled, Congress can extend the Safety Appliance
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guage, the dissent reasoned that States, although sovereigns, must be
subordinate to the Federal government's exercise of its constitutional
commerce power." 3 In this respect, and in contrast to the majority,
the dissent did not view the conflict in National League of Cities as a
controversy between equal sovereigns. 114 Thus the principle first
framed in California, and reaffirmed in Wirtz, supported the proposi-
tion that States engaging in economic activities stand on the same
footing as private individuals or corporations when challenging com-
merce legislation." 5
The dissent garnered further support for this proposition from
the Court's 1946 decision in Case v. Boutles," 6 which apparently re-
jected a state sovereignty limitation on Congress' war power. In Case,
the Federal government sought to enjoin the sale of timber on school
lands of the State of Washington at prices in excess of regulations
enacted pursuant to the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942." 7
 The
Act to all vehicles using an interstate railroad whether or not the vehicles are engaging
in intrastate commerce).
Not only was the State of California in direct competition with private economic
interests, but also the State, by engaging in an activity traditionally regulated by the
Federal government, must have consented to the Federal government's jurisdiction over
that activity. See Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 280
n. I (1973). See also Parden v. Terminal fly., 377 U.S. 184, 186 (1964).
113 426 U.S. at 859. See, e.g., North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686 (1946),
where the Court upheld the Public Utilities Holding Company Act under which the
Securities and Exchange Commission had ordered the North American Company to di-
vest itself of some properties. The Court in North American indicated that although the
Framers of the Constitution did not intend for Congress to be an absolute sovereign,
"so far as the commerce clause alone is concerned Congress has plenary power ...." Id.
at 705. Cf: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 457-58 (1976) {Brennan, J., concurring)
(sovereign immunity was relinquished to the Federal government at the time of the
framing of the Constitution because the States granted Congress specific enumerated
powers).
See also Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Board, 330 U.S. 767 (1947),
where justice Frankfurter stated that Congress under its comiutrce authority could en-
tirely displace a state policy when it conflicted with a federal policy. Id. at 780. The dis-
sent in National League of Cities cited Frankfurter's opinion in Bethlehem Steel as support
for its argument that because of the supremacy clause, "the enactment and enforcement
of state laws" could be overridden by contrary federal legislation. 426 U.S. at 875.
However, it should be noted that Frankfurter in Bethlehem Steel also declared:
But in legislating, Congress is not indulging in doctrinaire, tard-and-fast
curtailment of the State powers reflecting special State interests. Federal
legislation of this character must be construed with clue regard to accom-
modation between the assertions of new federal authority and the func-
tions of the individual states, as reflecting the historic and persistent con-
cerns of our dual system of government.
330 U.S. at 779-80. Implicit in this statement is the notion that the "dual system of gov-
ernment" concept does not allow Congress to obliterate state sovereignty totally.
"" 426 U.S. at 859. See Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 425-26 (1925). In
Sanitary Dist. the Federal government was able to enjoin a state corporation, the Sani-
tary District of Chicago, from diverting water from Lake Michigan in excess of that
amount authorized by the Secretary of War. See text and notes at notes 210-15 infra.
"3 426 U.S. at 873.
"" 327 U.S. 92 (1946).
" 7 Id. at 96. See Pub. 1. 79-108, 59 Stat. 306 (1942).
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State's argument, based on the tenth amendment, was that the "Act
cannot be applied to this sale because it was 'for the purpose of gain-
ing revenue to carry out an essential governmental function—the
education of its citizens.' ""8 The Court rejected this argument be-
cause it found that -the Emergency Price Control Act was valid exercise
of the congressional war power.'" According to the dissent, since the
war power and the commerce power are both delegated federal pow-
ers of equal stature,'" the concerns expressed in Case about creating a
state sovereignty limitation on the war power "are equally applicable
to restrictions on the commerce power .... "121
Based on this reading of precedent, the dissent concluded that a
judicial balancing of federal and state interests would be
unwarrantecl.' 22 Rather, the very structure of the constitutional form
of government, with elected representatives from all States, ensures
that state interests will be protected.' 23 Thus, according to the dissent,
the judicial "rote" ends when it is established that "Congress has not
" 8 1d. at 101. The Federal government had originally granted the lands to the
State of Washington upon condition they he used to support schools. Id. at 95.
"" Id. The Case Court noted to hold otherwise would "impair a prime purpose of
the Federal governments' establishment." Id. at 102.
125 426 . U.S. at 864 n. 6. The dissent 'expressed concern that the majority distin-
guished Case because they viewed Congress' war power . as more crucial to the Federal
government than the commerce power. To 'the dissent such a denigration of the com-
merce power was unjustifiable. The Supreme Court has considered the relative impor-
tance of the commerce clause power among Congress' enumerated powers. See, e.g.,
M.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 5'33-35 (1949).
121 426 U.S. at 864 n. 6.
122 Id. at 876. According to the dissent, the majority in National League of Cities
chose to redistribute judicially the balance of powers between States and the Federal
government in violation of "the fundamental tenet of our federalism that the extent of
federal intervention into the States' affairs in the exercise of delegated powers shall be
determined by the States' exercise of political power through their representatives in
Congress." Id. at 876-77. But see New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 594 (1946),
where Justice Douglas in dissent countered a similar argument with:
The notion that the sovereign position of the States must find its protec-
tion in the will of a transient majority of Congress is foreign to and a ne-
gation of our constitutional system. There will often be vital regional in-
terests represented by no majority in Congress. The Constitution was de-
signed to keep the balance between the States and the nation outside the
field of legislative controversy.
123 426 U.S. at 876. The dissent's contention ignores the fact that the Constitu-
tion provides for dual representation for the nation's citizens in both State and Federal
governments. Thus congressional representation was not intended to substitute for or
to usurp the constitutional right of a State's citizens to vote for their State and local
governments. The dissent's approach to constitutional federalism which allows the fed-
eral government pursuant to its commerce power to regulate and control absolutely ex-
penditures of State and local governments essentially negates this right by usurping the
citizen's vote regarding State and local budgets. Therefore, when traditional govern-
mental functions are implicated, such an absolute approach is apparently incompatible
with another fundamental tenet of constitutional federalism—state sovereignty. See
Ashton v. Cameron County Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936). Accordingly, in those situa-
tions, a balancing approach recognizing that both States and the Federal government
have sovereign status is probably more consonant with constitutional federalism.
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unreasonably regulated a subject matter orcommerce'...." 129
Applying these principles to the facts of the instant case, the dis-
sent maintained that Congress had "not made an unreasonable legisla-
tive judgment" that state employment activites affected interstate
commerce;' 25
 the decision to extend FLSA coverage to States con-
cerned a "policy issue" that had been resolved through the political
system.'"
The second objection raised by the dissent concerned both the
majority's interpretation of the tenth amendment and its use of pre-
cedent to find a state sovereignty limitation on the commerce power.
First, the dissent was plainly "astound[ed]" by the majority's reliance
on the tenth amendment as "an express declaration" of a state
sovereignty limitation on the commerce clause.' 27
 Citing - Gibbons v.
Ogden,' 28
 in which Chief Justice Marshall rejected the argument that
the States' "inseparable attribute of sovereignty ... secured by the
tenth amendment" was a limitation of Congress' commerce power,'"
the dissent declared that the majority departed "from a principle that
has remained unquestioned for 150 years."'" According to the dis-
1"
 426 U.S. at 861. E.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 261 (1964) ("How obstructions in commerce be removed ... is subject only to one
caveat—that the means chosen by ... [Congress) must be reasonably adopted to the
end permitted by the Constitution."), McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
421 (1819), was the first case to reflect a similar viewpoint. The dissent in National
League of Cities pointed out that past Supreme Court decisions have validated consis-
tently federal commerce regulation of state activities as long as they were activities actu-
ally involving "commerce." 426 U.S. at 860. See, e.g., Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v.
NLRB, 303 U.S. 453, 466 (1938), CIWihere federal control is sought over activities
which separately considered are intrastate, it must appear that there is a close and sub-
stantial relation to interstate commerce in order to justify the federal intervention
...."). This is the modern test for determining whether or not private activities can be
regulated by the Federal government pursuant to its commerce powers. See, e.g., Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255 (1964).
125 426 U.S. at 876.
1 " Id., quoting id. at 881 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"7
 426 U.S. at 862. The dissent pointed out that the majority relied upon a foot-
note in Fry, 421 U.S. at 547 n.7, stating that "Congress may not exercise power in a
fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a fed-
eral system" to conclude that the tenth amendment embodies a policy that state
sovereignty may limit even an enumerated federal power. 426 U.S. at 861 n. 4. Accord-
ing to the dissent, the footnote merely restated the Darby interpretation that the Federal
government may not intrude upon a State's sphere of autonomous power by exercising
powers not granted to it. Id. Therefore, following the Darby construction, the dissent de-
clared that because employee wages and hours were within the purview of the com-
merce clause, Congress by exercising this granted power through FLSA would not im-
permissibly invade state sovereignty in contravention of constitutional federalism. Id. at
871.
122
 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (acts of the legislature of the State of New York
which granted to certain persons the exclusive right to operate steamboats between New
York and New Jersey were held unconstitutional as violative of the commerce clause).
' 29 1d. at 198-201.
"9
 426 U.S. at 861 n4. For early Supreme Court constructions of the tenth
amendment see, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406, (1819); Mar-
tin v. Hunter's Lesee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 325-26 (1816). It is suggested, however,
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sent, the only significance of the tenth amendment was dearly estab-
lished in United States v. Darby,'' which explained that the tenth
amendment is but a truism reflecting the fact that the federal gov-
ernment has only specifically enumerated powers and as such cannot
assume powers beyond those granted.' 32
in addition, the dissent took issue with the majority's use of judi-
cial precedent to support the conclusion that state sovereignty limited
the federal commerce power. In particular, the dissent. maintained
that the majority's reliance on Chief justice Stone's New York opinion
was "plainly misplaced."'a In light of the fact that the Court in New
York upheld a nondiscriminatory federal tax on sales of bottled min-
eral waters by the State of New York, the dissent pointed out that
Chief Justice Stone was addressing only the principles of an implied
tax immunity and not the question of whether there existed a state
sovereignty limitation upon the exercise of the commerce power.'"
According to the dissent, the proper application of New York to the in-
stant case could be found in Justice Frankfurter's opinion, which ex-
plained that the only limitation on Congress' taxing power was that it
cannot discriminate against States.'" Because in the instant case the
1974 FLSA amendments applied equally to public and private em-
ployers, the dissent asserted that the amendments were not
discriminatory.'"
that the tenth amendment, while not an express constitutional limitation on delegated
federal powers, both reflects that States are indeed sovereigns and implicitly embodies
the concept that state sovereignty is the "balancing mechanism" by which States retain
autonomy over their designated spheres of authority. Cf. New York v. United States,
326 U.S. at 595 (Douglas, J., dissenting). With respect to this approach roost Supreme
Court decisions arc inapposite to the question whether state sovereignty can limit the
federal commerce power, for in decisions such as Darby state sovereignty was riot
threatened. Specifically, private interests were attempting to utilize the States' "balanc-
ing mechanism" to thwart congressional commerce regulation. In contrast, in cases in-
volving the regulation of proprietary-type state activities such as in California, state
sovereignty was threatened, but the balance was struck in favor of national legislation.
This followed because the State became involved with a railroad, an instrumentality of
commerce, clearly a function outside of the traditional internal concerns of States. See
notes 86, 112 SUPra.
131 312 U.S. 1(10, 124 (1941).
1 " 426 U.S. at 862-63. The Court in Darby further explained that "Wrom the be-
ginning and for many years the amendment, has been construed as not depriving the
national government of authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted
power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end." 312 U.S. at
124.
133 426 U.S. at 863.
"'hi. at 863-64. See New York, 326 U.S. at 583-84.
135 Id, at 866 n. 7, citing New York, 326 U.S. at 582.
13(1 426 U.S. at 866 11.7. Apart from the discrimination issue, the dissent further
noted that Justice Frankfurter stated that to the extent the State's immunity from taxa-
tion rested "on any vague sovereignty notions," it was inconsistent with California. Id.
But Justice Frankfurter conceded in New York that "Where are, of course, State ac-
tivities and State-owned property that partake of uniqueness front the point of inter-
governmental relations .... These could not be included for purposes of Federal taxa-
tion in any abstract category of taxpayers without taxing the State as a State." 326 U.S.
at 582,
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The dissent further challenged the majority's reliance on post-
Civil War cases such as Texas v. White 137 and Lane County v. Oregon' 38
which spoke of the essential role of the States within the federal sys-
tem. In view of their "unique historical setting," the dissent asserted
that these cases could be distinguished.' 39 In fact, the dissent pointed
out that it was during the Reconstruction that Congress enacted three
amendments, the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth, which en-
larged federal power and at the same time contracted state power.' 4 °
Thus, according to the dissent, these decisions simply did not support
any state sovereignty limitation on the commerce power."'
Having concluded that neither the Constitution nor judicial pre-
cedent supported a state sovereignty limitation on Congress' com-
merce power, the dissent then attacked the majority's use of the
"essential-function test." First, the dissent referred to Case v. Bowles, in
which the Court had found that formulations of a state sovereignty
standard based on distinctions between essential and nonessential state
functions was "unworkable." 142 To buttress this view, the dissent
pointed to the standard's inconsistent application even within the
majority's opinion. For example, the majority' was willing to condone
the federal impingement on essential state functions in Fry where the
federal government was able to freeze the wages of all state employees
pursuant to the Emergency Stabilization Ad of 1970.' 43 At the same
time, the majority was unwilling to distinguish the state functions in
Wirtz where FLSA regulations were applied to state hospitals and
mental institutions.' 44 Pointing to the obvious federal interference in
Fry, the dissent suggested that the Economic Stabilization Act directly
displaced the State's freedom of choice in their essential activities. 193
Thus, had the court not engaged in a "balancing" process, a literal
application of the essential-function test should have permitted the
States to raise their state sovereignty limitation to thwart the Economic
1 " 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869).
138 Id. at 71. For a discussion of Texas and Lane'County see notes 50, 51 supra.
139
	 U.S. at 867 n. 8.
140
 Id. See Fitzpatrick v. Bluer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976) (legislation enacted pur-
suant to the Civil War amendments sanctioned congressional intrusion into the States'
spheres of autonomy with a corresponding dim u nition of state sovereignty).
14 ' 426 U.S. at 858.
145 1d. at 865, citing 327 U.S. at 101 n, 7. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S.
at 580 (Frankfurter, J., opinion). According to its reading of the majority's essential
function test, the dissent envisioned that Congress now would be precluded from reg-
ulating "[any areas) 'that States have regarded as integral parts of their governmental
activities.'" 426 U.S. at 871, citing id. at 854 n. 18. Such an imprecise formulation would
not only protect the state activities covered by the 1974 FLSA amendments but would
also protect those activities involved in California and Case. Id. at 871. In view of this
broad restriction on Congress' commerce power, the dissent disparaged the essential-
function test as a "meaningless limitation" on the state sovereignty doctrine. Id.
15 1d. at 852.
" 4 Id. at 855.
"5 Id. at 872.
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Stabilization Act.'" In contrast, Wirtz was overruled "by [an] exercise
of raw judicial power" without a similar effort to balance or to distin-
guish the activities regulated by the 1966 FLSA amendments and
those now covered by the 1974 amendments."'
In view of the conflicting applications of the essential-function
test to Wirtz and Fry, the dissent argued that the majority, in essence,
was implementing a natural law of federalism approach found only in
the now discredited decisions which had struck down federal com-
merce legislation during the 1930'0 48 Therefore, National League of
Cities was characterized by the dissent as "a thinly veiled rationaliza-
tion for judicial supervision of a policy judgment that our system of
government reserves to Congress."'"
Even assuming arguendo that some state functions should be pro-
tected from direct federal encroachment, the dissent questioned the
majority's application of the essential-function test to the record be-
fore the Court. According to the dissent, it was untenable to argue
that the 1974 amendments impose federal policy objectives because
decisions as to wages and hours were not seen to implicate state
sovereignty.'" The dissent speculated that on the basis of its holding
the majority could "conclude that ... any federal regulation under
the commerce power 'will ... significantly alter or displace the States'
abilities to structure employer-employee relationships.' "' 51 The
"ominous" result of this determination would be that as long as essen-
tial state functions were implicated, the state sovereignty limitation
would absolutely prohibit Congress from regulating the wages and
hours of State employees under the commerce clause.' 52
1 " Id. Pinpointing only the weakest of the four factors that the majority used to
distinguish Fry from National League of Cities, the dissent argued that the distinction "be-
tween curbs against increasing wages and curbs against paying wages lower than the
federal minimum," which allowed Fly to remain undisturbed, was constitutionally insig-
nificant. Id.
' 47 Id. at 879.
'" Id. at 867-68. The dissent equated the analysis of the majority to the reason-
ing in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), United States v. Butler, 297 U.S.
1 (1936), and Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), where the use of the tenth
amendment to limit Congress' commerce authority over private activities ultimately
provoked a constitutional crisis for the Court. Id. The dissent noted that this restrictive
construction or the commerce clause was rejected eventually in United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. WO (1941), and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
426 U.S. at 868.
"2
 426 U.S. at 876.
"0 Id. at 873. The majority, of course, concluded that the 1974 FLSA amend-
ments impermissibly displaced "the States' abilities to structure employer-employee rela-
tionships ...." Id. at 851. Yet, as viewed by the dissent, the only possible constitutional
basis for this determination in the 1974 amendments was the new limitation on the
range of decisions made by States with regard to their employees' wages and hours. Id.
at 873-74.
"' Id. at 874, quoting id. at 851.
1" Id. at 875. 'Phis conclusion, which left the dissent "incredulous," id., was
perhaps an oblique reference to possible implications in National League of Cities on the
invalidity of the equal pay provisions of FLSA. See, e.g., Usery v. Allegheny County Inst.
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III. FEDERALISM CONCEPTS: THE HI STORICAL  BASIS FOR THE
DIVERGENT POSITIONS IN NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES
The narrow legal issue resolved in National League of Cities was
whether Congress' commerce authority extended to the regulation of
the wages and hours of state employees involved in essential state
functions. However, as was recognized by both the majority and the
dissent, the Court's resolution of this issue had broader ramifications
for the nature of the "constitutional" relationship between the States
and the Federal government within the federal system.' 53
 More speci-
fically, the majority concluded that the 1974 FLSA amendments not
only infringed upon the authority of State governments to make es-
sential policy decisions,'" but also subordinated the States' sovereign
status to a level on par with individual citizens.'" According to the
majority's view, this subordination, if permitted would affect. a "'start-
ling restructuring of our federal system. ...' "156
 Thus the Court in
National League of Cities perceived the intent of the Framers to be that
the Federal government, when exercising a specifically granted con-
stitutional power, does not have plenary authority to regulate every.
activity that somehow affects that power. Rather, the federal constitu-
tional system is so constructed that States are sovereign entities which
retain spheres of autonomous power which cannot be subordinated
even to an explicitly granted federal power.'" By contrast, the dissent
Dist., 544 F.2d 148 (3rd Cir. 1976); Christensen v. Iowa, 417 F. Stipp. 423 (N.D. E.D.
Iowa, 1976) (in both decisions the equal pay provision of FLSA were upheld against
state sovereignty challenges as to their constitutionality). See note 157 infra.
Nevertheless, the dissent did suggest that Congress could meet its objectives by
conditioning grams of federal funds to States upon compliance with the minimum wage
and maximum hour proVisions in FLSA. 426 U.S. at 880. Cf. Oklahoma v. United
States Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947). ("We do not see any vio-
lation of the state's sovereignty in the hearing or order. Oklahoma adopted the 'simple
expedient' of not yielding to what she urges is federal coercion The offer of ben-
efits to a state by the United States dependent upon cooperation by the state with fed-
eral plans, assumedly for the general welfare, is not unusual." (citations omitted)).
Furthermore, the majority in National League of Cities stated:
We express no view as to whether different results might obtain if Con-
gress seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by exercising
authority granted it under other sections of the Constitution such as the
spending power, Art. I § 8, cl. 1, or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
426 U.S. at 852 n. 17; See also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (the 1972
amendments to the Civil Rights Act (Title VII) which extended coverage to the States
as employers were not limited by state sovereignty because legislation enacted pursuant
to the fourteenth amendment permits Congress to intrude into the States' spheres of
autonomy).
153 See 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
'" Id. at 851.
' 55
 Id. at 855 n. 19.
' 56
 Id., quoting id. at 875 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" 7 But see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). In Fitzpatrick, male state em-
ployees claimed a State's statutory retirement benefit plan discriminated against them
on the basis of sex. Id. at 448. The Court held that the eleventh amendment and the
principle of sovereign immunity which it embodies are limited by the federal enforce-
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viewed the intent of the Framers to be that Congress, not the Court,
would decide the extent of the intervention of the commerce power
upon state Functions.'"
It is important to note that a strikingly similar divergence of
.opinion over the nature of constitutional federalism can be found in
the writings of the Framers themselves. This note will examine the
writings of Hamilton and Madison in The Federalist as being represen-
tative of these opposing views.' 5 " In order to place National League of
Cities in its proper historical perspective, the note will then trace the
development of this fundamental conflict in four lines of Supreme
Court decisions implicated in the National League of Cities opinion. Fi-
nally, the holding in National League of Cities will be reconsidered and
anayzed as a proper accommodation of the Madisonian and Hamilto-
nian approaches to constitutional federalism.
A. Madison's Position
As Madison pointed out in The Federalist, experience and reason
have shown that a precise test cannot be formulated to define the
meat provisions of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 456. Therefore, awards for re-
troactive retirement benefits and attorney fees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. (1970), are not precluded by
the eleventh amendment. Id. at 456-57. Justice Rehnquist, writing the majOrity (pinion
in Fitzpatrick, clearly indicated that Congress exercised its power under § 5 of the Saar-
teem!' amendment when it extended coverage to state employees in the 1972 amend-
ments to the Civil Rights Act (Tide VII). Pub. L. 92-318, 86 Stat. 375. Furthermore, in
language that appears to be contradictory to National League if Cities, justice Rehnquist
acknowledged that such cases as Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964),
"sanctioned intrusions by Congress, acting under the Civil War Amendments, into the
judicial, executive, and legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the
States." 427 U.S. at 455. Thus, Justice Rehnquist admitted that the Civil Rights legisla-
tion "was grounded on the expansion of Congress' power—with the corresponding dim-
inution of state sovereigny." ld. Nevertheless, he attempted to reconcile this statement
with his historical concept of state sovereignty outlined in National League of Cities by
explaining this "diminution" was "found to be intended by the Framers and made
part of die Constitution upon the State's ratification or those Amendments ...." Id. at
455-56.
By distinguishing Fitzpatrick from National League of Cities, the Court has appar-
ently answered in the negative the question whether a State could discriminate on any
basis against its own employees despite contrary federal regulations. 'Therefore, it is
submitted that the States will be able to raise the affirfnative state sovereignty limitation
of- National League of Cities to object only to federal commerce legislation which attempts
directly to regulate essential and traditional state functions. See, e.g., Usery v. Allegheny
County Hosp. Inst. Dist., 554 F. 2d 148,—(3rd Cir. 1976), where the Court upheld the
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d) (I) (1970), stating that the Act is severable
from the Fair Labor Standards Act and is implicitly based on the fourteenth amend-
ment. See also Christensen v. Iowa, 417 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. E.D. Iowa, 1976), where the
court upheld the Equal Pay Act because sex discrimination could not validly be "consid-
ered fundamental employment decisions' upon which the state's system for adminis-
tering the public law and furnishing public services rested." 417 F. Stipp. at 425.
' 5 ' 426 U.S. at 876.
1511 In that "legislative history" of the Constitution, both Hamilton and Madison
sought ratification of the proposed Constitution which provided for a stronger Federal
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exact boundaries of authority held by the Federal and State
governments.'" Nevertheless, Madison, like Hamilton, maintained
that the proposed Constitution would be ratified by the States in their
sovereign capacity.'" Therefore, since the will of the people was to be
performed though the medium of independent States, the act of
ratification would establish a federal as opposed to a national
Constitution.'" According to Madison, the importance of this distinc-
tion was reflected in the operation of the government itself: in a purely
federal system the Federal government's power would operate only on
the States in their political or sovereign capacity.'" However, Madison
acknowledged that the new Constitution also had aspects of a national
government, for it operated on the nation's citizens in their individual
capacities.'" At the same time, he cautioned that while the extent of a
purely national government's authority would naturally embody an in-
definite supremacy over individual and States alike, 165 the proposed
Constitution would not incorporate such an approach. Rather, Madi-
son asserted that the Constitution would be essentially federal in its
foundations, for States would have distinct and independent spheres
of authority not subject to the authority of the Federal government.'"
Therefore, the Federal government's powers would extend to certain
enumerated objects only, and the States would be left with "a re-
siduary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects."'"
Although Madison did not address directly the issue whether the
Federal government could constitutionally encroach upon state
sovereignty when acting pursuant to a granted power, it appears that
he envisaged the powers deposed to the Federal government as only
those "inclispensibly necessary to accomplish the purposes of the
Union." 1 e" With respect to the extent of these federal powers, Madi-
son believed that the Federal government would not have the capacity
to annihilate the State governments'" which were "arrayed with cer-
government invigorated with a new power to regulate interstate commerce. THE
FEDERALIST No. 45 at 314 U. Madison); No. 23 at 145-46 (A. Hamilton).
' 8 ' Id. No. 37 at 234 U. Madison).
"" Id. No. 39 at 254 U. Madison).
' 63 1d. at 255.
1414/d .
1 " Id. at 256.
16" Id. at 256, 257.
1 " 7 1d. at 256. Thus, Madison explained that the State governments will be im-
bued with a sovereign status and "will retain under the proposed Constitution a very
extensive portion of active sovereignty ...." Id. No. 45 at 310 U. Madison). Not only
will States be considered "essential parts of the federal Government," id. at 311, but also
their powers will be numerous, indefinite and will "extend to all objects, which, in the
ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and
the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State." Id. at 313.
169 Id. No. 46 at 323 U. Madison).
169 Id. On the issue of whether the Federal government would attempt to enlarge
its sphere of autonomy at the expense of the States, Madison believed that the Federal
government will be "disinclined to invade the rights of the individual States, or the pre-
rogatives of their governments." Id. at 319. This disinclination would be nutured by the
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tain dignities and attributes of sovereignty."'" Accordingly, Madison
characterized the newly proposed commerce clause as a federal power
necessary only to superintend the reciprocal trade between the
States."' Such a characterization implies that this delegated federal
power would be limited to the regulation of the incidents of interstate
trade to prevent deleterious commercial warfare between the States.' 72
Under Madison's view, then, the Federal government acting pursuant
to its commerce power seemingly was incapable of encroaching upon
the sphere of autonomous powers reserved to the States.
Since Madison's time, of course, the scope of the commerce
clause has been judicially construed to extend the sphere of Congress'
commerce authority to the point where it tends to overlap with
spheres of sovereign state power.'" Implicit in this developing con-
gruency of powers is a shift from the original tangential relationship
of independent spheres of authority contemplated by Madison to a
concrescent situation whereby the Federal government would intrude
upon the States' autonomous powers.' 74
 Yet, to Madison, the idea that
federal powers could go so far as to infringe upon state sovereignty
was a "degree of madness" that stood far outside his conception of a
federal-state system of allocated mutually exclusive powers." 5 In his
view, the Federal government's powers were narrowly defined so as
practically to assure affirmative state resistance to any encroachment
on state sovereignty.' 7
In sum, on the basis on his assertions of the importance of state
sovereignty and the concomitant narrowly defined role of enumerated
federal powers,'" it can be maintained that Madison's theory of con-
stitutional federalism is irreconcilable with a theory that allows en-
croachment on the valuable rights of States or the prerogatives of
their sovereign governments, even pursuant to a delegated federal
power. Consequently, Madison's writings have been interpreted to ad-
vocate a position of solicitude for state sovereignty whereby even del-
predispositions of the members of Congress toward local interests. Id. at 317. The
States' representatives will more likely he "partizans" of their respective States rather
than "guardians" of national interests. Id. at 31W See also id. No. 17 at 106 (A. Hamil-
ton). Nevertheless, Madison stated clearly that any attempt at an ambitious encroach-
ment on the State governments' authority would arouse the concerted resistance of all
States to prevent the annihilation of their governments. Id. No. 46 at 320 U. Madison).
' 70 Id. No. 45 at 309 U. Madison).
171 Id. No. 42 at.284 U. Madison).
172 Id. at 283.
'"Cf Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 157 (1971). In dissent in Perez Justice
Stewart stated that "I think the Framers of the Constitution never intended that the Na-
tional Government might define as a crime and prosecute such wholly local activity
float' sharking) through the enactment of federal criminal laws."
cf. Elrod v. Burns 427, U.S. 347, 375-76 (1976), where Chief Justice Burger
in dissent discussing National League of Cities stated that: "Constant inroads on the pow-
ers of the States to manage their own affairs cannot fail to complicate our system and
centralize more power in Washington,"
'7s
	 FEDERALIST No. 46 at 320 0. Madison).
176 1d. No. 46 at 320, 323 U. Madison).
177
	 No. 39 at 256; No. 45 at 313 0. Madison).
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egated federal powers are not permitted to affect adversely sovereign
state functions. "8
B. Hamilton's- Position
Hamilton, like Madison, wanted to correct the "radical vice" of
the existing confederation where general legislation was directed only
toward the States in their corporate or collective capacities and not
toward the individuals within the States. 179 To that end, Hamilton
sought a strong national government which would "contain in itself
every power requisite to the full accomplishment of the objects com-
mitted to its care ... free from every other control, but [with] a re-
gard to the public good and to the sense of the people."'" According
to this view, the national government then would be empowered to
pass all laws and regulations having a relationship to any matter
within the Federal government's jurisdiction."' Thus, Hamilton's pos-
ition has been construed as one which holds that the Federal govern-
ment, operating pursuant to supreme delegated -powers, has no cor-
relative obligation to preserve a particular sovereign relationship be-
tween the States and the Federal government. 1 S 2
However, Hamilton steadfastly maintained that "State govern-
ments, by their original constitutions, are invested with complete
sovereignty." 183 As echoed in some current judicial sentiments,'"
Hamilton's plan for the constitutional system did not envisage a com-
plete consolidation of the States into one absolute sovereignty where
State governments would be subordinate, retaining only residual pow-
ers granted by the general will.' 85 Still, it has been suggested that
"Hamilton's assurance that the state governments retain all the rights
of sovereignty that they had before, and that were not exclusively del-
17 ' See Cowen, What is Left of the Tenth Amendment? 39 N.C.L. Rtiv. 154, 157
(1961).
178 THE FEDERALIST No. 15 at 93 (A. Hamilton).
1" Id. No. 31 at 195 (A. Hamilton).
' 8 ' Id. No. 23 at 149 (A. Hamilton).
'" G. Dietze, The Federalist, A Classic on Federalism and Free Government 167 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Dietze].
185 THE FEDERALIST No. 31 at 197-98 (A. Hamilton).
184 See note 174 supra.
185
 Ti-tr, FEDERALIST No. 32 at 199.200 (A. Hamilton). Hamilton explained:
[T]he plan of the Convention aims only at a partial Union or consolida-
tion, the State Governments would clearly retain all the rights of
sovereignty which they before had and which were not by that act
exclusively delegated to the United States. This exclusive delegation or
rather this alienation of State sovereignty would only exist in three cases;
where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority to
the Union; where it granted in one instance an authority to the Union and
in another prohibited the States from exercising the like authority; and
where it granted an authority to the Union, to which similar authority in




egated to the United States is a mere truism;" 1 " his proposition im-
plies that the Federal government surely has all the powers delegated
to it and has displaced all State powers in those areas.
The conclusion that Hamilton sought a "high degree of power
concentration in the national government"" 7 under the new Constitu-
tion is exemplified in his statements that the regulation of interstate
and foreign commerce was to be one Of the principle purposes of the
Federal government.'" To Hamilton, one of the chief sources of con-
tention between the States under the Articles of Confederation was
the cutthroat commercial competition "owing to the fact that the regu-
lation of interstate commerce was not vested in the federal govern-
ment, but belonged to the jurisdiction of the states,""" The new Con-
stitution, as framed by Hamilton, would correct this problem by ex-
pressly delegating all authority over interstate commerce to the Fed-
eral government. Since this power was to be executed exclusively by
the national government, Hamilton asserted that the Constitution "au-
thorizes the national legislature to pass all necessary and proper laws" to
regulate interstate commerce,'" In other words, insofar as the Con-
stitution exclusively delegates the commerce power to Congress,
Hamilton maintained that Congress could pass any laws to regulate
interstate commerce, and these laws were to be supreme regardless of
their effect on the States.'" In sum, though Hamilton recognized the
existence of residual state powers . under the proposed
Constitution—an unavoidable consequence of a true federal sys-
tem—Hamilton was above all an advocate of national power who
believed that because the power over interstate commerce was exclu-
sively delegated to Congress state rights in this area necessarily were
limited.'"
The practical consequence of the fact that conflicting theoretical
viewpoints on constitutional federalism emerged in The Federalist is
that the Supreme Court has attempted to interpret the Constitution in
a manner that reflected either the Madisonian or Hamiltonian
philosophy of the federal-state system of government.'" Unfortu-
"" Dietze, supra note 182, at 166-67. Sec United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
124 (1941).
Dietze, supra note 182, at 166.
"" TI1E,FEDERALIST No. 23 at 146-47 (A. Hamilton).
18" Dietze, supra note 182 at 205. See generally H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v.
DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 533.35 (1949).
19° THE FEDERALIST No. 33 at 205 (A. Hamilton). Furthermore, Hamilton main-
tained that the national government in the first instance must judge the necessity and
propriety of the laws to he passed to execute the commerce power, but the people
should take measures to redress the injury done to the Constitution if the federal gov-
ernment exceeds its authority and makes "a tyrannical use of its powers." Id. at 206.
"" Id. at 204-05. Hamilton admitted, however, that it does not follow "that acts of
the larger society which are not pursuant to its constitutional powers, but which are inva-
sions of the residuary authorities of the smaller societies, will become the supreme law
of the land." Id. at 207,
Dietze, supra note 182, at 170.
193 Castro, The Doctrinal Development of the Tenth Amendment, 51 W. VA. L. Q. 227,
228 (1949).
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nately, because these philosophies have been judicially construed to
represent opposing positions on state sovereignty, past decisions in-
volving state sovereignty challenges have tended to oscillate between
two extreme positions depending on the Court's prevelant political
philosophy.'" Following a Madisonian view of federalism, some
Courts have construed the concepts of sovereignty embodied in the
tenth amendment to hold that the Court must preserve a particular
relationship between the States and the Federal government.'" In
some older decisions, however, this Mitclisonian viewpoint had been
developed to the extreme position of permitting the States under the
guise of state sovereignty to thwart the Federal government's corn-
merce authority.' 66
 On the other hand, the prevelant trend of the
Court since the late 1930's has been toward a Hamiltonian position." 7
Under this view, the Court has construed concepts of national supre-
macy delineated in the supremacy clause to hold that the Court is
under ino "constitutional compulsion" to recognize state sovereignty
and thereby has found virtually no limitations on the Federal
government's commerce power.'" Except for Wirtz,""' however, most
modern decisions involving concepts of state sovereignty have
eschewed the extreme Hamiltonian approach of allowing direct fed-
eral regulation where essential state functions are implicated.
Four lines of cases were implicated in National League of Cities in
which state sovereignty was advanced as a limitation on Congress'
commerce authority over essential state functions. 200 The following
194 Id. at 231-32.
' 9" Id. at 228.
See, e.g., Carter v, Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (the tenth amendment
was advanced as a limitation on Congress' commerce authority over private interests);
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (same); Schechter Poultry Corp. v, United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (same). This extreme Madisonian philosophy was discre-
dited in such cases as Wickard v. Hilburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), Darby v. United States,
312 U.S. 100 (1940), and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
I " Castro, supra note 193, at 245.
' 9" Id. at 228, 246-47.
199
 This extreme Hamiltonian approach of Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183
(1968) has now been discredited in National League of Cities. 426 U.S. at 855. See also
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937). The Jones & Laughlin
Court succinctly explained the problem:
The authority of the federal government may nut be pushed to such an
extreme as to destroy the distinction, which the commerce clause establishes
between commerce 'among the several States' and the internal concerns of
a State. That distinction between what is national and what is local in the
activities of commerce is vital to the maintenance of our federal system.
(emphasis added). Cf: Ashton v. Cameron County Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936) ("The
sovereignty of the state essential to its proper functioning under the Federal Constitu-
tion cannot be surrendered; it cannot be taken away by any form of legislation.").
too See 426 U.S. at 855, 843, 852, 843. These lines of cases are not an exhaustive
list of all judicial decisions involving the state sovereignty concept embodied in constitu-
tional federalism. See, e.g., Ashton v. Cameron County Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 530-32
(1936); Indian Motor Cycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570, 575-76 (1931); Texas v.
White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869); Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71,
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analysis of these lines will demonstrate that in most decisions the
Court has attempted to accommodate federal and state interests by
adopting a balancing approach incorporating elements of both the
Hamiltonian and Madisonian philosophies of constitutional
federalism. Viewed in this respect, the Court's resolution in National
League of Cities of whether an affirmative state sovereignty limitation
protects essential state activities from direct federal commerce regula-
tions can best be characterized as a shift away from the extreme
Hamiltonian philosophy as advocated by the dissent toward a view
more consistent with the Madisonian philosophy. National League of
Cities, however, is not a total swing toward the discredited extreme in
that it incorporates a balancing approach to constitutional federalism
in which the States and the Federal government maintain spheres of
inviolable powers.
IV. AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF
STATE SOVEREIGNTY LIMITATION ON THE FEDERAL COMMERCE POWER
A. Federal Regulation of State Proprietary-type Activities
The first line of cases dealing with state sovereignty involve the
steady expansion of the federal commerce power over proprietary-
type activities of States and eventually over nonproprietary state func-
tions as well. This series began in 1824 with the seminal decision of
Gibbons v. Ogden. 21 ' Gibbons involved a dispute over the question
whether the States could license private vessels conducting trade be-
tween two states. Chief Justice Marshall, holding that only the Federal
government could license vessels involved in interstate commerce, de-
fined the extent of Congress' commerce power as a grant of plenary
authority which "acknowledges no limitations, other than are pre-
scribed in the constitution."'"' However, he also acknowledged that
Congress' power to license vessels "implies no claim of a direct power
to regulate the purely internal commerce of a State, or to act directly
on its system of police."'" It seems, then, that Chief Justice Marshall
subscribed to the Hamiltonian theory that the new Constitution ex-
pressly granted to Congress the supreme authority over interstate
commerce.'" Thus, while he did point out that "the State govern-
ments remain, and constitute a most important part of our system,"205
it appears that Marshall, like Hamilton, would not find a state
sovereignty limitation on Congress' power to regulate matters affect-
ing interstate commerce.
76 (1869). See notes 50, 51 supra for discussion of Texas and Lane County. See note 291
infra for discussion of Ashton.
" I 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
" 2 /d. at 196.
"3
 M. at 204.
'" Castro, supra note 193, at 232-35.
2 " 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 199.
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Having laid the foundations for a broad application of Congress'
commerce authority in the first quarter of the nineteenth century in
Gibbons, the Supreme Court nearly a hundred years later in the
Minnesota Rate Cases 206
 further developed the Hamiltonian theme of a
strong central government. The Minnesota Rate Cases involved a chal-
lenge to a state commission's intrastate rates for private railroads
which apparently forced some interstate carriers to lower their rates
in order to stay competitive. Although the Court found that the States'
inherent power to set intrastate rates was not in itself a burden on in-
terstate commerce, 207
 the decision clearly forewarned the future di-
minution of state power and the concommitant expansion of the fed-
eral commerce power. The Court proclaimed that "Where is no room
... for the assertion of state power in hostility to the authorized exer-
cise of Federal power ...; [however,] [t]his is not to say that the Na-
tion may deal with the internal concerns of the State, as such... .',208
Thus, the Supreme Court in the Minnesota Rate Cases acknowledged
that States retain residual sovereign powers to control intrastate com-
merce, but concluded that state burdens on interstate commerce,
under any guise, would impermissibly interfere with an authority
granted only to the national legislature. 0 "
Although the Minnesota Rate Cases established that a State's
rate-making power over intrastate commerce was a sovereign state
function,"" the Court twelve years later in Sanitary District v. United
States 2 " implied that residual state powers could never limit the fed-
eral commerce power. In Sanitapy. District the Attorney General of the
United States sought to enjoin a corporation of Illinois from with-
drawing -water from Lake Michigan via a drainage channel in excess
of the amount authorized by the Secretary of War pursuant to an in-
ternational treaty with Great Britain. 212
 Allowing the injunction, the
Court rejected the State of Illinois' claim that the water withdrawal
was necessary for the accomplishment of the purely internal public
health concerns of sewage disposa1. 2 " In a strong declaration of the
Hamiltonian philosophy, the Court made it quite clear that this was
"not a controversy , between equals."214 Thus, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that in this case the United States was asserting its sovereign
power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce and that this
"" 230 U.S. 352 (1931).
2 ° 7 1d. at 431-32.
Zoe Id. at 399.
2D2 Id. at 396-97.
2" Bui see Houston, E. & W. Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (in-
trastate railroad rates set by state commission might be reset by the Federal government
if there is an adverse effect on interstate commerce).
211 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
212 Id. at 423-24. The Secretary of War pursuant to the Act of March 3, 1899, §
10, 30 Stat. 1121, 1151, authorized the limit on water withdrawal by the State from
Lake Michigan. Id.




"power is superior to that of the States to provide for the welfare or
necessities of their inhabitants." 215
Despite the special factors of an international treaty and the in-
volvement of several states affected by the diversion of water in
Sanitary District, the Court later affirmed Sanitary District's "unequal
sovereign" concept. in United States v. California . 2113 In California, the
Federal government sought to recover a fine for a State's violation of
the federal Safety Appliance Act"' in the operation of a state-owned
railroad. 2 " The State of California argued that it was "performing a
public function in its sovereign capacity," and therefore, it could not
be constitutionally subjected to this federal act. 2 " The Supreme
Court, again following the Hamiltonian rationale that the national
government's commerce power extends to States and private interests
alike, thought that it was "unimportant to say whether the state con-
ducts its railroad in its 'sovereign' or its 'private' capacity." 22 " In hold-
ing that the State had to comply with the federal act, the Court stated
"[t]he sovereign power of the states is necessarily diminished to the
2 " Id. at 426. Certainly federal legislation or regulations enacted . pursuant to an
international treaty may be differentiated from congressional enactments only directed
to internal domestic concerns when their constitutionality is challenged by the States. cf.
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) ("Valid treaties of course 'are binding
within the territorial limits of the States as they are elsewhere throughout the dominion
of the United States' .... No doubt the great body of private. relations usually fall
within the control of the State, but a treaty may also override its power." (citations omit-
ted)). c: also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I, 18 (1956) ("To the extent that the United
States can validly make treaties, the people and the States have delegated their power to
the National Government and the Tenth Amendment is no barrier.").
Nevertheless, the dissent in National League of Cities cited Sanitary Dist. as support-
ing the proposition that States must always be subserviant to the federal commerce
power. 426 U.S. at 859. This support was gleaned from the Sanitary Dist. Court's dictum
that the State could not validly "affect the level of the Lakes ... without the consent of
the United States, even were there no international covenant in the case." 266 U.S. at
426. This consent was deemed necessary because of the Federal government's "ultimate
interest in the Lakes" resulting from the water level's effect, nut only on several States,
but also on foreign power. Id. Therefore, because of the confluence of international
treaty implications with the interstate commerce aspects of controlling navigable waters
touching several States, Sanitary Dist is probably inapposite to the dissent's contention.
Furthermore, the Sanitary Dist. Court pointed out that the State of Illinois had not op-
erated the drainage channel traditionally, but rather had opened it only with the per-
mission of the Federal government. Id. at 428-9, Accordingly, the Sanitary Dist. Court
was not compelled to determine whether sewage disposal was an essential state function.
The federally permitted activity, the drainage channel, could not, by definition, be a
traditional state activity. In view of this fact, the Sanitary Dist. Court did not reach the
question central to National League of Cities whether Congress pursuant to its commerce
authority could regulate directly all state functions.
2" 297 U.S. 175, 184 (1936).
"7 Act of March 2, 1893 c. 196, 11§ 2, 6, 27 Stat. 531, as amended April 1, 1896,
29 Stat. 85.
219 1d. at 180.
919 Id. at 183.
"° Id.
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exent of the grants of power to the federal government in the
Constitution." 22
In contrast to California, which clearly involved. a nonessential or
nontraditional state function, the Supreme Court for the first time in
the 1968 case of Maryland v. Wirtz 222 squarely faced the issue whether
Congress' commerce power extended to more traditional state
functions—such as state-operated hospitals and schools. In Wirtz, the
Court upheld the 1966 amendments to FLSA, finding that these pro-
visions established only minimum wages and maximum hours with re-
spect to state employees of hospitals, institutions, and schools; they
did "not otherwise affect the way in which school and hospital duties
are performed:"223
 Rejecting the State's contention that the Act un-
constitutionally interfered with "sovereign state functions," the Court
relied on Sanitary District and declared that "the Federal Government,
when acting within a delegated power, may override countervailing
state interests whether these be described as 'governmental' or 'pro-
prietary' in character."224 Thus, expressly following the Hamiltonian
rationale of California which rejected any limits on Congress' com-
merce authority where a state activity was implicated, 225 the Court in
Wirtz upheld the constitutionality of the amendments. 226
 In so doing,
the Court found that Congress had a "rational basis" to prescribe
minimum labor standards for schools and hospitals, including those
operated by States. 227
 In sum, the Court allowed Congress to expand
its regulatory commerce powers to include state functions because it
concluded that the state sovereignty doctrine may not be used to "pro-
tect enterprises indistinguishable in their effect on commerce from
private businesses, simply because those enterprises happen to be run
by the States for the benefit of their citizens." 228
Although ostensibly an insignificant extension of the "rational
basis" test previously utilized by the Court to sanction the scope of
congressional commerce legislation,'" Marylaral v. Wirtz established a
new constitutional principle. In particular, the decision indicated that
in future state challenges to commerce regulations, the Supreme
Court would apparently examine only the effect of a particular state
enterprise upon interstate commerce. Accordingly, the Court would
give little merit to claims of state sovereignty. Thus, wherever state
2" Id. at 184. See also California v, Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 568 (1957); California v.
United States, 320 U.S. 577, 586 (1944); accord, Fitzpatrick v. Bluer, 427 U.S. 445, 455
(1976). See text and notes at notes 111-12 supra for the relationship of California to
National League of Cities.
222
	 U.S. 183 (1968).
323 /d. at 193.
"4
 Id. at 195.
223 Id. at 198 ("'I'he principle of United States v. CalijOrnia is controlling here.").
228 392 U.S. at 201.
227




 E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964).
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enterprises significantly affect interstate commerce,'" Wirtz pushed
the Hamiltonian philosophy to an extreme and portended a potential
demise of state sovereignty, in that federal commerce legislation could
"disrupt. the fiscal policy of the States and threatened] their au-
tonomy in the regulation" of traditional internal concerns.''tI
B. State Sovereignty Concepts in the Doctrine of Inter-governmental Tax
Ipnmunity
The second line of cases in which a state sovereignty limitation
has been raised to bar federal regulations is that involving the implied
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. Although no such
express constitutional immunity exists, the doctrine of an implied
limitation was first developed by Chief justice Marshall in McCulloch v.
Marvland. 232 This doctrine was first employed to accord to all officials
of one government immunity from taxation by the other. 23 " However,
subsequent Supreme Court decisions have significantly eroded this
protection.'" At present, therefore, Congress may impose an income
tax on all state employees regardless of whether they are participating
in a function characterized as essential to the maintenance of a state
23" 392 U.S. at 204 (Douglas J., dissenting). justice Douglas contended that state
governments themselves made substantial purchases of goods flowing in interstate
commerce, and therefnre fit the statutory definition of an 'enterprise' substantially af-
fecting interstate commerce. Furthermore, although state-operated hospitals and
schools at compete with their private counterparts, States cannot be deemed to
have consented to federal commerce jurisdiction; this is not a situation where a state is
engaging in a traditional instrumentality of interstate commerce such as with the state-
owned railroads in California. See note 112 supra.
231 Id. at 203 (Douglas, j., dissenting). This demise would occur as Congress
enacted any commerce legislation extending regulation to essential state functions. As
Justice Douglas posited in dissent in Wirtz, constitutional principles of federalism should
limit Congress' commerce regulation to functions not essential to the States, otherwise
"the National Government could devour the essentials of state sovereignty, though that
sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment." Id. at 204-05. In light of this poten-
tial demise of state sovereignty, the Court in National League of Cities, Ibllowing Justice
Douglas's reasoning, effectively rejected the "rational basis" rationale when essential
state functions are implicated. 426 U.S. at 845.
:32 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). The related doctrine of sovereign immunity of
a State from suit in a federal court by her own citizens is grounded on the eleventh
amendment. See Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279,
280 (1973). For discussion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see note 260 infra,
233 See, e.g., The Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871).
234 See, e.g., Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) (state taxa-
tion of federal officials permitted). Helvering v. Gerhardt., 304 U.S. 405 (1938) (federal
taxation of state officials permitted). The Gerhardt Court, reflecting a Madisonian
philosophy, did acknowledge, however, that:
[Tihere may be state agencies of such a character and so intimately as-
sociated with the performance of an indispensable function of state gov-
ernment that any taxation of it would threaten such interference with the
functions of government itself as to be considered beyond the reach of the
federal taxing power.
304 U.S. at 424.
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government. 235
 Nevertheless, in the context of a tax on state functions
themselves, support might be found in the tax immunity doctrine for
a state sovereignty limitation on the commerce clause. 235 Specifically,
the Supreme Court in the 1926 tax case of Metcalf & Eddy v.
Mitche11, 237
 expressing a strong Madisonian viewpoint, articulated a
test similar to an essential-function test that might be utilized to protect
certain state functions from direct federal taxation. In Metcalf & Eddy,
the plaintiffs protested a tax assessed on income of a copartnership
because they claimed that they were exempt under the War Revenue
Act of 1917;n 8
 they further contended that Congress had no power
to tax the income which was compensation for their services as
consulting engineers under contracts with States and municipalities. 239
Although the Court held that these engineers were not "employees"
of a State or its subdivision whose earnings were exempt under the
War Revenue Act,'" the Court also considered whether the "constitu-
tional system of dual sovereign governments is such as to prohibit im-
pliedly the federal government from taxing the instrumentalities of a
state government.... "241
In this regard, the Court in Metcalf & Eddy explained that
agencies "intimately connected with the necessary functions of
government" through which a State "immediately and directly
exercises its sovereign powers" should be afforded tax immunity. 242
The Court in Metcalf & Eddy offered a rationale for this "necessary
function" exemption based on its interpretation of McCulloch v.
Maryland: 243
Its origin was due to the essential requirement of our
constitutional system that the federal government must
exercise its authority within the territorial limits of the
states; and it rests on the conviction that each government,
in order that it may administer its affairs within its own
sphere, must be left free from undue interference by the
other."'
However, the Metcalf & Eddy Court did warn that it was necessarily an
unclear distinction that separates those state activities which are
235
 Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. at 554 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
238 See 426 U.S. at 843, 844.
23T 269 U.S. 514 (1926).
2"
 Act of October 3, 1917, ch. 63, § 209, 40 Stat. 300.
239 269 U.S. at 518.
Zoo
	 at 520.
241 Id. at 521.
242
 Id, at 522,
243 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
244 269 U.S. at 523. See also The Collector v. Day 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 127
(1871) (overruled); Dobbins v. The Commissioners of Erie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
435, 447 (1842). The Day Court explained that "the exemption rests upon necessary
implication, and is upheld by the great law of self-preservation; an any government,
whose means employed in conducting its operations, if subject to the control of another
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"essential" and those which are not, and that leixperience has shown
that there is no formula by which that line may be plotted with
precision in advance."245
The difficulty of determining which state activities are deemed
essential and therefore protected in nn federal taxation manifested
itself again in the divided opinion of New York v. United States. 246 The
Court in this 1946 case was clearly troubled with the tax immunity
doctrine when it considered whether the Federal government could
impose a nondiscriminatory tax on a State's mineral water business.
The State of New York contended that it should be allowed a tax im-
munity because it was " 'engaged in the exercise of a usual, traditional
and essential governmental function.' " 247 The Court was unable to
reach a majority on the issue; therefore, a plurality of the Court
barely upheld the tax. Justice Frankfurter, following a Hamiltonian
philosophy, announced the judgment of the Court in a separate opin-
ion in which he recognized "that ours is a federal constitutional sys-
tem, as expressly recognized in the Tenth Amendment...." 2"
Nevertheless, he maintained that to rest the federal taxing power on a
proprietary versus governmental function distinction was "too shifting
a basis for determining constitutional power."'" Thus, the Federal tax
was valid as long as it was not exercised in a discriminatory
man ner. 25 "
Three members of the Court concurred with Chief Justice Stone
who, in a more Madisonian tone, stated that a nondiscriminatory fed-
eral tax "may nevertheless so affect the State, merely because it is a
State that is being taxed, as to interfere unduly with the State's per-
formance of its sovereign functions of government." 2 " Additionally,
two dissenting Justices clearly reflecting the Madisonian viewpoint de-
clared that a nondiscriminatory federal tax on any state activity would
undermine the historical understandings of state sovereignty em-
bodied in the tenth amendment, thereby placing "the Sovereign States
on the same plane as private citizens, and making] the Sovereign
States pay the federal government for the privilege of exercising the
and distinct government, cart only exist at the mercy of that government." 78 U.S. at
127.
145 269 U.S at 523. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. at 558 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) ("Such a distinction would undoubtedly present gray areas to be marked out
on a case-by-case basis, as is true in applying any number of other constitutional princi-
ples."),
14 " 326 U.S. 572 (1946).




45 ' Id. at 587 (Stone, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Stone's opinion revealed that
he would apply a two-step analysis similar to that used in National League of Cities. Speci-
fically, after determining whether a particular state activity was a governmental func-
tion, Chief Justice Stone would then consider whether such a nondiscriminatory tax on
that activity unduly interferes with the State's performance of its sovereign functions.
Id. at 588.
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powers of sovereignty guaranteed them by the Constitution." 252
Despite the implication that a majority of the New York Court
would have recognized a state sovereignty limitation on a delegated
federal power, 253 it can be credibly maintained that New York con-
cerned only the extent of the federal taxing power. 254 In this respect,
the "necessary function" limitation outlined in Metcalf & Eddy, which
might restrict the federal government from taxing traditional state
functions, does not necessarily support a state sovereignty limitation
on Congress' commerce authority. 255 This conclusion is predicated
upon the unique stature of the taxing power among Congress' enum-
erated powers. If the Federal government could forbid all state taxa-
tion as being incompatible with federal taxation, the economic vitality
of State governments could cease 258—without doubt unconstitutionally
upsetting the federal-state system. 251 Therefore, this reciprocal im-
munity of State and Federal governments from taxation necessarily
flows from the destructive force inherent in an indefinite power to tax
lodged exclusively with one government. 258 No such considerations
are attendant to the power over interstate commerce; thus, 'this exclu-
sive congressional authority to prevent "competitions of commerce" 259
152 1d. at 596 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justices Douglas and Black apparently ad-
vocated a state sovereignty doctrine similar to the limitation found in National League of
Cities.
253 After analyzing the comments of the six Justices in the concurring and dis-
senting opinions in New York, the majority in National League of Cities concluded that
these Justices recognized historical doctrines of state sovereignty and were unwilling to
permit the Federal government under its taxing power to rank all state functions on
par with private activities. 426 U.S. at 843 n. 13. See also Fry v. United States, where
Justice Rehnquist, in dissent reasoned that the tax immunity "restEs} solely on a concept
of constitutional federalism which should likewise limit federal power under the Com-
merce Clause." 421 U.S. at 554.
254 See 426 U.S. at 863-64 (Brennan. J., dissenting).
255 See id. at 866 n. 7 (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. California, 297
U.S. 175, 185 (1936). Even with regard to a state sovereignty limitation on the taxing
power, the dissent in National League of Cities adverted that the tax immunity doctrine
should be narrowly limited because of Itihe danger to the federal power to tax
hypothesizing any constraint, derived from state sovereignty ...." 426 U.S. at 869 n.
10.
255
	 What is Left of the Tenth Amendment?, 39 N.C.L. REV. 154, 182 (1961).
257 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 429-31 (1819). See also New
York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 593 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Even Hamilton rec-
ognized that concurrent jurisdiction over the power to tax was the only practical solution
to prevent a coerced subordination of state authority to the Federal government. THE
FEDERALIST No, 33 at 208 (A. Hamilton). Hamilton explained:
The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases results from the
division of the sovereign power; and the rule that all authorities of which
the States are not explicitly divested in favour of the Union remain with
them in full vigour, is not only a theoretical consequence of that division,
but is clearly admitted by the whole tenor of the instrument which con-
tains the articles of the proposed constitution.
Id. No. 32 at 230 (A. Hamilton).
258
 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819). See THE FED-
ERALIST No. 34 at 215 (A. Hamilton).
259 THE FEDERALIST No. 7 at 39 (A. Hamilton).
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cannot be reasonably analogized to the divided power to tax. In sum,
despite the Madisonian-type sentiments expressed by many of the Jus-
tices in the tax immunity cases, the existence of a tax immunity doc-
trine is inapposite to the question whether there exists an affirmative
state sovereignty limitation on Congress' commerce power. 2 °
C. Federal Preemption of State Functions during a National Emergency
While decisions involving the doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity do not squarely support or reject the state sovereignty limi-
tation on the federal commerce power, the 1946 decision of Case v.
Bowles' is indicative of a third line of cases in which a State has ap-
parently been denied the right to raise a state sovereignty defense to
prevent the enforcement of a federal power. In Case, the State of
Washington contended that it could sell timber on state school lands
at a price in excess of that set under the Federal Emergency Price
Control Act262 because it was "'for the purpose of gaining revenue to
carry out an essential governmental function—the education of its
citizens.' "2" The Supreme Court, explaining that the Act had been
sustained as a congressional exercise of the war power, rejected the
suggestion that the federal war power should be limited by restricting
28 " See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 200 (1824). The analogous
common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity of a State from suit by its own citizens also
does not support or reject the principle that state sovereignty bars commerce legislation
from directly regulating essential state functions. However, the sovereign immunity de-
cisions of Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), and Employees v. Department
of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973), both involving suits under federal
commerce regulation, reveal that the "governmental" versus "proprietary" distinction
may retain current vitality. This distinction has been utilized to determine which func-
tions of state governments possess attributes of sovereignty.
In Parden, the State of Alabama contended that Congress was without power to
subject it to a federal suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C.
§§ 51-60 (1970). The Court held that the sovereign immunity doctrine did not bar a
state employee injured while working on a state-owned railroad from suing under
FELA. 377 U.S. at 190-91. Since FELA was enacted pursuant to Congress' commerce
authority, the Court reasoned that sovereignty defenses were invalid in this case be-
cause "the States surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted Con-
gress the power to regulate commerce." Id. at 191. The State of Alabama thus was
deemed to have consented to suits in federal courts under FELA by operating a rail-
road. Id. at 186. On the other hand, the Court in Employees, faced with a similar issue of
whether a State could assert a sovereign immunity defense to an employee suit brought
under ELSA, upheld the State's defense, 4l 1 U.S. at 287. The Court reaffirmed the
doctrine that "an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by
her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State." Id. at 280. Furthermore, the
Court distinguished Parden, which had allowed a state railroad employee's suit, on the,
basis that the nonprofit hospitals and training schools involved in Employees were not
proprietary. Id. at 284. By allowing the sovereign immunity defense, the Court appar-
ently embraced the Madisonian principle that "harmonious federalism" necessitated the
protection of certain state functions from suit, in this case those "not proprietary." Id. at
286.
281 327 U.S. 92 (1946).
2"2 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub, L. 79-108, 59 Stat, 306.
2" 327 U.S. at 101.
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its operation on essential state governmental functions. 264 Thus follow-
ing the Hamiltonian rationale of California where the Court had pre-
viously rejected the dichotomy between proprietary and governmental
functions, 265 the Court stated that to hold otherwise on the facts in
Case would "impair a prime purpose of the Federal Government's
establishment"—the power to make war. 266 In subordinating the
State's power to sell timber to Congress' exercise of its war power the
Court in Case gave short shrift to the State's essential-function defense
and did not articulate whether the selling of timber, allegedly to pro-
vide education revenue, actually constituted an essential-function. Al-
though arguably the sale of timber was not in an area traditionally re-
garded by States as an essential governmental function, Case does lend
support for the Hamiltonian philosophy that the Federal
government's enumerated powers cannot be limited by state
sovereignty. 267 However, the holding was grounded on the war power
which has been exercised historically only during great national ex-
igencies. These circumstances apparently allow delegated federal
powers to operate to the full extent of their theoretical scope unre-
strained by the state sovereignty limitations existant during normal
situations. 268
Similarly, in circumstances of exceptional economic conditions,
congressional authority was permitted to operate unrestrained by limi-
tations of state sovereignty in Fly v. United States. 26" In Fry, the Federal
government sued to enjoin the State of Ohio from granting wage in-
creases to State employees in excess of those permitted under the
Economic Stabilization Act. 27 ° The Court, manifesting a Hamiltonian
philosophy, rejected the contention that the federal action impermis-
sibly interfered with sovereign state functions. 271 Following the Wirtz
rationale which held that the Fair Labor Standards Act could be con-
stitutionally applied to state hospitals and schools, the Court in Fry
said that the Economic Stabilization Act was an "emergency measure
to counter severe inflation." 272 Further, the commerce clause gave
"the President authority to freeze virtually all wages and prices, in-
264 Id .
265 Id. at 101. See California, 297 U.S. at 183-84.
266 327 U.S. at 102.
262 If the sales in Case are characterized as raising revenue for education, then
certainly the activity must qualify as an essential state function. It should be noted,
however, that most states would not be able to claim that sales of timber were essential
functions unless the Funds received were design'ated traditionally by law for the use of
education.
2" See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. at 558 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Congress
may well in time of declared war have extraordinary authority to regulate activities in
the national interest which could not be reached by the commerce power alone."). See
THE FEorlitat.isT No. 45 at 313 (j. Madison); Cowen, supra note 256, at 164-69.
262 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
27° Id. at 545. See Title 11 of the Act of Aug. 15, 1970, Pub. L. 91-379, 84 Stat.
299, as amended 12 U.S.C. 1904 (Supp. 1 1970).
27 ' Id. at 547-48.
222 Id. at 548.
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eluding the wages of state and local government employees."' How-
ever, Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, declared that the Framers of the
Constitution understood that:
[Me States were sovereign in many respects, and that al-
though their legislative authority could be superseded by
Congress in many areas where Congress was competent to
act, Congress was nonetheless not free to deal with a Suite
as if it were just another individual or business enterprise
subject to regulation. 274
Case and Fry certainly reflect elements of the Hamiltonian ap-
proach to constitutional federalism in that States were not permitted
to frustrate national legislation in the name of state sovereignty. In re-
trospect, however, both these decisions might be understood to rep-
resent particular situations where, on balance, compelling national
considerations overrode state sovereignty interests allowing the Fed-
eral government pursuant to a delegated power to regulate fully all
state functions. It can be reasoned then that these cases do not refute
the existence of a possible state sovereignty limitation on delegated
federal powers, but rather are examples of a "balancing approach" to
constitutional federalism."'
D. The Tenth Amendment as a Specific Limitation on the Commerce Clause
The last line of Supreme Court cases in which a state sovereignty
limitation is discussed is that in which the tenth amendment 278 was
raised as a specific limitation on the federal commerce power. The
tenth amendment was originally adopted as part of the Bill of Rights
to reaffirm the concept of sovereignty implicit in statehood. 277 This
explicit reaffirmation was thought necessary to counterbalance the con-
cept of federal supremacy expressly embodied in the "necessary and
proper" 278 and "supremacy"27 " clauses of the Constitution. 289 Faced
with these conflicting concepts incorporated in the tenth amendment
and the supremacy clause respectively, the early Supreme Court deci-
sions, following a Hamiltonian philosophy, 281 construed the tenth
27° Id.
2 " Id. at 557.
275
	
U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). For a discussion of this balancing
approach analysis see text and notes at notes 102-08 supra.
27° "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. X.
277 Cowen, supra note 256, at 154-55.
2 " U.S. CONST, art, I § 8, cl. 18.
170 Id. at art. VI, cl. 2.
"" Cowen, supra note 256, at 156,
1181 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304
(1816).
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amendment narrowly with an accompanying broad construction of the
commerce clause that has never yet been exceeded. 282 For example,
Chief Justice Marshall articulated in McCulloch "that the government
of the Union, though limited in its powers is supreme within its
sphere of action" and the tenth amendment was merely "formed for
the purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies which have been ex-
cited ...."283
However, from Marshall's death until the late 1930's, the Sup-
reme Court began to follow a Madisonian idealogy giving effect to the
tenth .amendment. 294 In particular, the amendment was utilized as a
basis for striking down national commerce legislation which purpor-
tedly invaded the autonomous powers of state governments. Specifi-
cally, in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States 285 the Supreme Court
overturned indictments for violations of the codes of fair competition
in the poultry industry in part because the federal enabling legislation
was held to be an invalid delegation of power. 286 Furthermore,
federalism implications drawn from the tenth amendment were ad-
vanced as authority for the proposition that the scope of the com-
merce clause could not embrace all private activities having an indirect
effect on interstate commerce. 287 This limitation was raised to prevent
the denigration of state authority over purely domestic concerns. 288
Similarly, other congressional commerce acts regulating wages and
hours of the mining industry 289 and reducing farm surplus through
the regulation of acreage and production 2111 ' were nullified based on
state sovereignty implications in the tenth amendment.'"
2 " 2 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942).
283 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405-6 (1819). However, Chief Justice Marshall did not
hold the tenth amendment as meaningless because he recognized that "whether a par-
ticular power ... has been delegated to the one government, or prohibited to the other
twill] depend on a fair construction of the whole (Constitution]." Id. at 406.
2
" 4 See generally Castro, supra note 193, at 235-243.
283
 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
2 " 6 Id. at 551.
2 " Id. at 546-49.
2" Id. at 549.
2" Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 293 (1936) (Bituminous Coal Conser-
vation Act of 1935, ch. 824, 49 Stat. 991).
2"
 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I, 68 (1936) (Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1933, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31).
29 ' See also Ashton v. Cameron County Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936). In Ashton Con-
gress had attempted in 1937 to amend the Bankruptcy Act by removing the previous
exemption for States and their political subdivisions. Act of May 24, 1934, 48 Stat. 798.
However, the amendments were struck down as being unconstitutional on the basis of
state sovereignty. 298 U.S. at 531-32. The Court acknowledged that an irrigation im-
provement district organized under state laws to reclaim arid land was a political sub-
division of a State. Consequently, the district could not avail itself of the Act and de-
clare bankruptcy because its fiscal affairs were deemed affairs of the State and not sub-
ject to control or interference by the Federal government. Id. at 528. Explaining this
conclusion in language that appears irreconcilable with the California opinion of the
same year, the Court advanced:
The sovereignty of the State essential to its proper functioning under the
Federal Constitution cannot be surrendered; it cannot be taken away by
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However, following the attempted court-packing plan of 1937,
the Supreme Court began a shift back to the Hamiltonian approach
by "taking a broader view of the commerce power." 2" The culmina-
tion of this Hamiltonian revival was in United States v. Darigna where
the Court rejected the tenth amendment challenge to the validity of
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 by a lumber manufacturer in-
dicted for violations of the Act. The Court dismissed the tenth
amendment as merely "a truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered"214 and held "that the power of Congress to regu-
late interstate commerce extends to the regulation through legislative
action of activities intrastate which have a substantial effect on the
commerce or the exercise of the Congressional power over it." 2 "5
Following this Hamiltonian rationale, the Supreme Court in sub-
sequent decisions began to extend Congress' commerce power into
areas previously considered within the purview of the States. 26" This
broadening of the scope of the commerce power accompanied by the
concommitant retraction of state sovereignty concepts apparently
sounded the "death knell" for the tenth amendment. 2" This conclu-
sion follows because, in contrast to most pre-1937 decisions where the
tenth amendment was found to be an express state sovereignty limita-
any form of legislation	 [T]he Federal Government, acting under the
bankruptcy clause, may [not) impose its will and impair state powers—pass
laws inconsistent with the idea of sovereignty.
Id. at 528.
222 Cowen, supra note 256, at 169. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937). In Junes & Laughlin, where a corporation refused to obey
NLRB orders to cease unfair labor practices, the Supreme Court upheld the National
Labor Relations Act or 1935 as being within the federal commerce power and mint an
unconstitutional invasion of the States' reserved powers over their local concerns. Id. at
30. The Court reasoned that Congress had the power to regulate even intrastate ac-
tivities if they had such a "close and substantial relationship" to interstate commerce
that their control was essential and appropriate to protect interstate commerce Frain
impermissible burdens. Id. at 36.
2" 312 U.S, I 00 (1941). It should be noted, however, that both Darby and Jones &
Laughlin involved the regulation of private activities. Therefore, these decisions did not
hold squarely that the Federal government could directly regulate traditional state gov-
ernmental activities, Rather, these cases broadened the scope of Congress' commerce
power over private entities that affected interstate commerce.
294 312 U.S. at 124.
222 1d. at 119 -20.
226 E.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). The Supreme Court in Wickard
upheld the constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, ch. 30, ft 1, 52
Stat. 31, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 1281 el. seq. (1941) that extended federal commerce
regulation to production of farm goods not intended in any part for commerce, but
wholly for consumption on the farm. Id. at 128-29. In rejecting a wheat farmer's suit
for declaratory judgment that the Act's wheat marketing provisions were not sustainable
under the commerce clause, Justice Jackson echoed sentiments from Gibbons warning
that effective restraints on the federa commerce power "must proceed from the politi-
cal rather than from judicial processes." Id. at 120. The dissent in National League of
Cities expressly followed this Wickard dictum. 426 U.S. at 857-58, See also Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
2 " Cowen, supra note 256, at 173.
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tion on federal powers, Darby and subsequent cases treated the
amendment as a relatively unimportant truism. 2"" Accordingly, from
1937 federal regulation of private activities having an indirect but sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce was consistently sustained. The
only attendant, limitation on this authority was that Congress could
not unreasonably regulate a subject matter of "commerce." 2 ""
This analytic approach parallels Hamilton's theory on the scope
of the commerce clause."'" Arguably, however, such decisions as
Darby, in extending Congress' regulatory purview over both intrastate
and interstate private activities, only prevent private interests from as-
serting the States' tenth amendment defense in an attempt to thwart
congressional regulation. Nevertheless, implications amalgamated
from decisions like California, Case, New York, and Wirtz lend color to
the Hamiltonian-based rationale that the Court can extend Congress'
commerce power over all state functions unrestrained by the tenth
amendment. 3" In refusing to accept a state sovereignty restriction
based on distinctions between essential (traditional) and nonessential
(proprietary) governmental activities, Sat:ital.), District, California, Jus-
tice Frankfurter's New York opinion, and of course Wirtz, implicitly re-
ject the argument that the tenth amendment embodies any state
sovereignty limitation on delegated federal powers. Based on the same
analysis, Case explicitly discarded the tenth amendment as w limitation
on Congress' war power being exercised to combat national
exigencies. 3 "2
V. CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM REQUIRES A BALANCING OF STATE
SOVEREIGNTY INTERESTS  AGAINST THE FEDERAL COMMERCE POWER
In comparison to most recent commerce clause precedent, the
Court's holding in National League of Cities may at first glance appear
to portend a shift toward a Madisonian-type philosophy and a height-
ened solicitude for States' interests. 303 Nevertheless, it is submitted
that National League qf Cities embodies a correct approach to constitu-
tional federalism. The validity of this viewpoint is based on three fac-
tors: a close assessment of past precedent; an historical perspective of
the concepts of constitutional federalism as recognized by both Hamil-
ton and Madison; and a recognition of the concepts of state
"8 Cf. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 403 (1963) (The Court labeled the States
tenth amendment contention that it could enjoin a nonlawyer, registered to practice
before the United States Patent Office, from preparing patent applications in Florida as
"singularly without merit.").
'" 426 U.S. at 860 (Brennan,,., dissenting).
300 See text at notes 187-91 supra.
30 ' One commentator suggested that decisions such as New York "can never be
made to coincide with the constitutional doctrines on which the United States federal-
state system of government was founded." Castro, supra note 193, at 247.
3°2
	 U.S. at 101.
3" See Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, The Tenth Amendment and the New Federalism, 89
HARV. L. R. 1871, 1874 (1976).
778
NOTES
sovereignty embodied in the tenth amendment.
With respect to past precedent, it must be noted that very few
commerce clause decisions are relevant to the inquiry made in
National League of Cities. First, while expounding a strong Hamiltonian
theme of a broad scope for Congress' commerce power, tenth
amendment decisions such as Darby are inapposite. Darby correctly ex-
panded Congress' commerce power over private interests where fed-
eral regulations are meant to be plenary, but its broad tenth amend-
ment dictum cannot be applied correctly to a situation involving es-
sential state governmental interests. 314
Additionally, the tax immunity decisions, while recognizing that
state sovereignty may ultimately limit the Federal government's right
to tax state governmental functions as such, also cannot be approp-
riately analogized to a state sovereignty challenge to the application of
the federal commerce power. This is so because the taxing power is
not exclusively delegated to the Federal government as is the com-
merce power and because the commerce power does not necessarily
have the destructive potential inherent in the power to tax. 30°
Finally, although the Wirtz line of cases are clearly on point,
Wirtz was based solely on dicta in Sanitary District and California;'"
both decisions are factually distinguishable from Wirtz and National
League of Cities. Sanitary District concerned only a limitation on a State's
right to control the flow of water in a drainage channel affecting a
traditional instrumentality of interstate commerce—the navigable wa-
ters of several States and a foreign nation. 3° Furthermore, the drain-
age channel involved in Sanitary District was constructed only with the
permission of the Federal government, thus removing it from the
category of a traditional state function. 3 " While extending the
Sanitary District rationale to limit a State's power over a railroad,
another traditional instrumentality of commerce, the California Court
did not intend for the holding to be extended to limit the States' right.
to control their essential governmental functions. 3 " Nevertheless, the
Wirtz Court, divorcing the Sanitary District and California rationales
from their factual situations, improperly limited the States' power
over their traditional governmental functions. By contrast, the Fry and
Case decisions indicate the proper approach to constitutional
federalism. 31 " Under this approach the commerce power remains ple-
nary where nonessential state functions are implicated. 3" However,
when federal policy decisions interfere with governmental Functions
"'See text and notes at notes 127-32 supra.
3"s
	
text at notes 232-60 supra.
3"e
	 U.S. at 195, 19S-99. See text and notes at notes 222-31 supra.
3" 266 U.S. at 423-25. See text and notes at notes 211-15 supra.
3"e
	 U.S. at 428.
3" Compare United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 184-85 (1936) with Ashton
v. Cameron County Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 531-32 (1936).
3 " See text at notes 260-75 supra.
3" 426 U.S. 845, 854 n. 18.
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basically having no private counterparts—essential state func-
tions—the Court will balance state and federal interests to deter-
mine whether the federal interests are such as to override state
sovereignty. 3 ' 2
This "balancing approach" utilized by the Court in National
League of Cities 313 provides a more flexible and practical framework
for determining whether federal commerce legislation directly affect-
ing States as States comports with the federal system of government.
In allowing federal commerce legislation to override state sovereignty
because of compelling countervailing national considerations, the
Court permits Congress to tailor legislation to combat pervasive na-
tional problems. 314 At the same time, this approach accommodates
both federal and state interests and preserves the sovereign relation-
ship between the States and the Federal government as recognized by
the Framers of the Constitution and expressly reflected in the tenth
amendment.
An analysis of the historical concepts of constitutional federalism
embodied in the "legislative history" of the Constitution reveals that
both Hamilton and Madison framed an essential role for the States as
sovereigns within the federal system.'" While disagreeing on the
exact scope of the new commerce power, both Hamilton and Madison
advocated that the sovereignty of States would be a fundamental tenet
of constitutional fecleralism. 3 " This state sovereignty principle, then,
312 See text and notes at notes 102-08 supra. The district court in National League
of Cities conceded that most "governmental functions ... are not seriously in competi-
tion with private industry." National League of Cities, Civil No. 74-1812 (D.D.C. Dec. 31,
1974) (per curiam) reprinted in Brief for Appellant Appendix A at 7a. Thus the
rationale for the 1974 FLSA amendments was essentially based on the principle that
States, as employers, should be subject to the same legislation as private employers. See
Hearings on H. R. 7130 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1 at 552 (1971); Hearings on S. 1861 & S. 2259 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Sen.' Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. pt.
1 at 29 (1971); Brief for the Appellant at 25-26. Therefore without any pervasive na-
tional economic interests at stake, the Court in National League of Cities framed the issue
as an encroachment on state sovereignty because the 1974 amendments to FLSA under
the broad penumbra of the commerce clause attempted to interfere with traditionally
internal affairs of the States. 426 U.S. at 852. This interference was the result of a shift
to a federal level of the policy decisions concerning state employees engaged in gov-
ernmental activities not seriously in competition with private counterparts—essential
state functions. Id. at 848.
313 1d. at 856 (Blackmun, J. concurring); Id. at 872 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3 1 1
 The Court's opinion is unclear as to exactly what factors will be considered in
this balancing of interests. Apparently, the Court will approach the problem only on a
case-by-case basis. The analysis used to distinguish Fry suggests that the Court will
weigh the pervasiveness of the national problem under attack against the temporal as-
pects of the federal legislation, the new financial burdens imposed on the States, and
the degree of imposition of new federal policy choices on the States. The Court's opin-
ion is also unclear as to whether a factual inquiry is necessitated to consider these fac-
tors. Furthermore, it should be noted that the last factor, unlike the first three, is not
readily discernible in a factual inquiry.
315 See text at notes 158-92 supra.
"° See text at notes 177, 182 supra.
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prevents the Federal government from encroaching upon the States'
spheres of autonomous powers even pursuant to the constitutionally
delegated commerce power.
The tenth amendment expressly reflects this policy of the
sovereign relationship between the States and the Federal
government. 3 t 7
 Without doubt the exact contours of this relationship
have shifted since the ratification of the Constitution. Nevertheless,
the tenth amendment embodies a continuing guarantee that sovereign
States stand on a different plane than private parties when challeng-
ing the exercise of a delegated federal power. 3 " In those rare situa-
tions where there is a "clashing of sovereignty" between the States and
the Federal government, the tenth amendment cannot be disregarded
as in Wirtz, but must be viewed as something more than a truism. 3 "
These situations occur only when essential or traditional state func-
tions are infringed upon by federal commerce legislation and no
compelling countervailing national considerations are present. If these
conditions obtain, the Supreme Court, as final arbiter, must decide
whether the tenth amendment, as the "balancing mechanism" in con-
stitutional federalism, mandates the invalidation of the federal legisla-
tion in order to preserve state sovereignty.
CONCLUSION
In light of the essential role framed for the States within the
federal system and the balancing policy toward constitutional
federalism embodied in the tenth amendment, the invalidation of the
• 1974 amendments to the lair Labor Standards Act in National League
of Cities should not be viewed as an unwarranted restriction on Con-
gress' commerce power. Retaining the Hamiltonian approach to Con-
gress' plenary commerce authority over private activities and nones-
sential or nontraditional state functions, the National League qf Cities
Court employed a balancing approach to evaluate only the propriety
of federal commerce regulation directly affecting essential state func-
tions. This approach is not, then, a total shift to an extreme Madiso-
nian position of the supremacy of States' rights where the Federal
government would be absolutely barred from regulating any aspects
of any state functions. 32 " Rather, the decision can be more approp-
riately viewed as a necessary protection of a fundamental tenet of
a"See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 594-95 (1946) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting). See note 130 supra.
315 /d. at 596.
" 9 Id. at 597.
32"
 Many commentators have viewed the holding in National League of Cities as se-
verely restricting Congress' commerce authority to extend preemptive federal collective
bargaining rights to State and local governmental employees. See, e.g., Aaron, Labor Law
Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1975
- 76 Term, 92 LAB. RE1., RE. 311, 345 n.30 (1976).
Thus proposed bills for public sector bargaining at the State and local levels, see, e.g.,
H.R. 77, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); 5.3294 & S.3295, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974),
which would remove the exemption for State and their political divisions from the Na-
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constitutional federalism as recognized by both Hamilton and
Madison—the preservation of the States' sovereignty over their re-
spective spheres of authority.
ROBERT THOMAS MORGAN
Constitutional Law — Freedom of Speech and Association — Gov-
ernment Employees—Elrod v. Burns.' In December, 1970, petitioner
Richard Elrod, a Democrat, replaced Republican Joseph Woods as
Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois. 2
 The Sheriff's Office is staffed by
approximately three thousand employees, half of whom are "'merit'
employees" protected from discharge without cause. 3 After taking of-
fice as Sheriff, Elrod continued the long-standing local practice of dis-
charging the vast majority of noncivil service opposition party em-
ployees and replacing them with employees who shared his political
affiliations. When Elrod instituted this practice, three discharged em-
ployees and one employee threatened with discharge brought suit in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.' They alleged that the pa-
tronage system of employment as practiced by Sheriff Elrod in combi-
nation with Mayor Richard J. Daley,5 the Democratic Organization of
Cook County, and the Democratic Central Committee of Cook
County° violated their first and fourteenth amendment rights, and
tional Labor Relations Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2) (1970), are constitutionally suspect in
light of National League of Cities. Such a direct federal regulation of State and local gov-
ernmental employer-employee relationships might be considered by the Supreme Court
more intrusive of state sovereignly than the congressional extension of the minimum
wage and maximum hour provisions in the 1974 FLSA amendments. See ABA,
SECTION' Or LABOR RELATIONS LAW, Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector, Part I: Federal
Regulation of the Public Sector (Jan. 1977) for a more extensive discussion of the implica-
tions of National League. of Gille.t on proposed federal regulation of state public sector
labor relations.
427 U.S. 347 (1976).
2 Id. at 350.
'See id. at 377 (Powell, J., dissenting),
Id. at 349-350. The discharged respondents included the Chief Deputy of the
Process Division, who supervised various departments of the office, a bailiff and a se-
curity guard at the juvenile court, and an "employee." Id at 350-51.
Mayor Daley's involvement was grounded in part upon his position as leader of
the party organization in Cook County. Appendix at 6. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347
(1976).
g Plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy on the part of all the defendants to carry out the
unlawful firings. Defendants allegedly effectuated the conspiracy
(a) By screening the political party affiliation of the members of plaintiff'
class. (b) By soliciting members of plaintiff' class to meet the conditions
[for continuing employment, such as obtaining sponsorship letters, shifting
party affiliation and the like]. (c) By supplying letters of recommendation
or approval, commonly known as patronage letters, to certain members of
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